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Abstract: Government speech creates a paradox at the heart of the First 
Amendment. To satisfy traditional First Amendment tests, the govern-
ment must show that it is not discriminating against a viewpoint. And yet if 
the government shows that it is condemning or supporting a viewpoint, it 
may be able to invoke the government speech defense and thereby avoid 
constitutional scrutiny altogether. Government speech doctrine therefore 
rewards what the rest of the First Amendment forbids: viewpoint dis-
crimination against private speech. This is both a theoretical puzzle and 
an increasingly important practical problem. In cases like Pleasant Grove 
City, Utah v. Summum, the city’s disagreement with a private message was 
the heart of its successful government speech argument. Why is viewpoint 
discrimination flatly forbidden in one area of First Amendment law and 
entirely exempt from scrutiny in another? This Article explores that ques-
tion and why it matters, and suggests ways to reconcile these apparently 
incompatible principles. 
Introduction 
 It is a bedrock principle of the First Amendment that “government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”1 And yet, “the Government’s own speech 
. . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny,” even when it has the 
effect of limiting private speech.2 The upshot of these apparently con-
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1 Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see also U.S. Const. amend. I; Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Where the government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative attributes, we 
hold the regulation unconstitutional.”). 
2 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). There are, however, some 
“external” constitutional constraints. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 
1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“For even if the Free Speech Clause neither 
restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by the Consti-
tution’s other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and Equal 
Protection Clauses.”); Daniel W. Park, Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Be-
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flicting principles is that, pursuant to government speech doctrine, the 
government may be able to restrict private expression “because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content,” so long as in so do-
ing it is expressing its own viewpoint.3 Why is viewpoint discrimination 
flatly forbidden in one area of First Amendment law and entirely ex-
empt from scrutiny in another?4 Has government speech doctrine un-
dermined the First Amendment’s seemingly inviolable viewpoint neu-
trality requirement?5 
 Government speech doctrine is young, and its youthful exuber-
ance and ambition—not to mention its adolescent awkwardness—has 
become cause for some parental concern. In 2009, in Pleasant Grove 
City, Utah v. Summum, the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent govern-
ment speech case, Justice Souter warned, “it would do well for us to go 
slow in setting its bounds, which will affect existing doctrine in ways not 
yet explored.”6 As the doctrine grows, the constitutional exemption it 
receives is increasingly bumping into another apparently absolute First 
Amendment principle—the requirement that the government be view-
point neutral when it restricts private speech.7 The prevention of view-
point discrimination has long been considered the central concern of 
the First Amendment,8 and yet in some cases government speech doc-
trine seems to allow—if not outright encourage—viewpoint discrimina-
tion in the extreme. Indeed, one way for the government to prevail in a 
government speech case is to show that a private speaker’s message is 
contrary to, and interfering with, its own.9 
 This does not (yet) mean that government speech doctrine has 
swallowed the rest of the First Amendment by permitting unchecked 
                                                                                                                      
tween Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 Gonz. L. Rev. 113, 145 (2010) (“The only clear 
limit on government speech is the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”). 
3 See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
4 Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its 
Own Expression, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1317, 1319 (2004) (“Under prevailing doctrine, 
government’s viewpoint-based regulation of private speech is constitutionally suspect, 
while government is largely free to determine which views it will itself express.”). 
5 See infra notes 37–194 and accompanying text. 
6 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring). 
7 See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Ve-
hicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) (“No clear standard has yet been enunciated in 
our circuit or by the Supreme Court for determining when the government is ‘speaking’ 
and thus able to draw viewpoint-based distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech 
and thus unable to do so.”). 
8 See infra notes 42–65 and accompanying text. 
9 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138 (upholding the government’s right to reject a 
private monument donated for placement in a public park). 
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viewpoint discrimination against private speakers.10 Many incidents of 
government speech arguably can be viewpoint neutral, at least from the 
government’s point of view. Although the government speech doctrine 
does not permit total bans on the expression of a private viewpoint, it 
does allow what had previously been thought forbidden: the burden-
ing, even if not silencing, of private viewpoints because the government 
disagrees with them. 
 Summum provides a perfect example. In that case, a religious order 
called the Summum sought to erect a monument in a public park that 
already contained other privately donated monuments.11 Pleasant 
Grove City rejected the monument on the grounds that it was not con-
sistent with the city’s purported message of celebrating local history 
and community.12 The city argued that the placement of monuments 
in a public park was not susceptible to public forum analysis, but was 
instead an incident of government speech and therefore exempt from 
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.13 The Court agreed, holding 
that “the City’s decision to accept certain privately donated monuments 
while rejecting respondent’s is best viewed as a form of government 
speech. As a result, the City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech 
Clause . . . .”14 
 Although some have described Summum as an “easy” case,15 others 
are made uneasy by the fact that it blessed a government action that 
was for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from viewpoint dis-
crimination in a public park—the prototypical example of impermissi-
ble speech regulation.16 What this discrepancy illustrates is that some 
                                                                                                                      
 
10 See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Ve-
lazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–49 (2001); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). 
11 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30. 
12 Id. at 1130 (“The City denied the requests and explained that its practice was to limit 
monuments in the Park to those that ‘either (1) directly relate to the history of Pleasant 
Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove com-
munity.’” (quoting app. at 61)). 
13 See id. at 1131. 
14 Id. at 1138. 
15 Helen L. Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 
899, 913 (2010). 
16 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 Green 
Bag 2d 413, 426–27 (2009) (suggesting that Summum may permit governments to engage 
in what would otherwise be “blatantly unconstitutional form[s] of viewpoint discrimina-
tion,” for example by adopting demonstrations as their own speech). For my own thoughts 
on Summum, see generally Joseph Blocher, Government Property and Government Speech, 52 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1413 (2011) [hereinafter Blocher, Government Property and Government 
Speech], available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/working_papers/37/; Joseph Blocher, 
Property and Speech in Summum, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 83 (2009) [hereinafter 
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criticisms of government speech—and there have been many trenchant 
criticisms17—have failed to grasp fully the nature of the beast. It is gen-
erally supposed that government speech is dangerous because it threat-
ens to drown out or distort private discourse due to the government’s 
limitless resources and powerful platforms for communication.18 This 
supposition may well be true, but it understates the problem. Govern-
ment speech not only distorts the marketplace of ideas, in many cases it 
directly regulates individual private speakers—either forbidding them to 
express viewpoints they support or compelling them to express view-
points they do not support. Government speech doctrine, after all, is an 
absolute government defense to First Amendment claims by individu-
als.19 Thus, government speech doctrine increasingly threatens First 
Amendment values both as a practical matter—because the govern-
ment is doing more and more “speaking”20—and as a theoretical mat-
ter, because the interests the Amendment has long been thought to 
protect are precisely those threatened by the doctrine’s expansion.21 
Lacking guidance from the Supreme Court, federal appellate courts 
have struggled to articulate consistent rules reconciling these appar-
ently incompatible principles.22 
                                                                                                                      
 
Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum], available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/colloquy/2009/31/. 
17 A comprehensive listing is impossible, but any sampling would have to include: 
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1377 (2001); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 Hastings 
L.J. 983 (2005); and Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s 
Source, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 587 (2008); as well as insightful works on unconstitutional condi-
tions and subsidized speech such as David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting 
Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1992); and Robert 
C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151 (1996). 
18 See, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, Epilogue to Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the 
Modern Era 313 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (“[T]he massive pres-
ence of government in the society presents extraordinary opportunities for it to distort the 
marketplace of ideas.”); Cole, supra note 17, at 682 (“[T]he root of the problem lies in the 
paradoxical fact that government-funded speech both creates possibilities for a more de-
mocratic and inclusive public debate and threatens to dominate the market and over-
whelm individual autonomy with its vast resources.”); Robert Kamenshine, The First 
Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1104, 1105–06 (1979). 
19 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
20 See Norton, supra note 17, at 588 (noting the increasing number of government 
speech cases). 
21 See Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1248, 1293 (2010) (“Expansion of the government speech doctrine therefore threat-
ens to erode constitutional protections by allowing the government to discriminate based 
on viewpoint in an increasingly wide range of circumstances.”). 
22 The most obvious examples of this inconsistency are the license plate cases. Al-
though the facts of the cases differ slightly, it is notable that four U.S. courts of appeals 
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 This Article aims to address the conflict first by identifying and de-
scribing it, and then by offering some possible solutions. Part I first sets 
the stage by introducing the protagonist and antagonist: government 
speech doctrine and the First Amendment’s commitment to viewpoint 
neutrality.23 It then shows how the former conflicts with the latter—not 
only, as is often supposed, by flooding the marketplace with powerful 
government messages and thereby drowning out private viewpoints, but 
also by permitting the regulation of private speakers who wish to ex-
press viewpoints that conflict with those of the government. This Article 
is especially concerned with the latter scenario, which arises whenever 
the government displaces, burdens, or limits private speech on the 
grounds that it conflicts with the government’s own message.24 Such a 
practice is not simply distortion of the marketplace; it is viewpoint dis-
crimination.25 Part I therefore recasts the problem of government 
speech as one of viewpoint-based government regulation, a problem 
that cannot be avoided by simply characterizing government speech as 
a form of “subsidy.” 
 These doctrinal difficulties are caused by underlying and unre-
solved theoretical questions, three of which are addressed in Part II.26 
First, what does it mean for the government to have a viewpoint? Most 
laws presumably have a “purpose,” but if that is sufficient to character-
ize them as government speech then the First Amendment’s protec-
tions all but vanish, as it would only apply to purposeless restrictions of 
private speech. Even so, some First Amendment scholars (including 
                                                                                                                      
have found license plates to be private speech. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th 
Cir. 2009); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008); Ariz. Life Coal. 
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2008); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 
621. By contrast, more recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
license plates are a hybrid of government and private speech, and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit also determined them to be government speech. See ACLU of 
Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379–80 (6th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. 
v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004). 
23 See infra notes 37–194 and accompanying text. 
24 Naturally, in some instances the government itself arguably has no particular “view-
point” other than an informational one—a weather or defense alert, for example. See 
Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government Expres-
sion in America 6–10 (1983); Cole, supra note 17, at 702. To engage in that kind of “in-
formative” speech, the government may need to temporarily displace private speakers, but 
it will not necessarily have done so for viewpoint-based reasons. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
513 (permitting public school officials to suppress student speech in school if it “materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”). 
25 See Cole, supra note 17, at 703–04. 
26 See infra notes 195–307 and accompanying text. 
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then-professor Elena Kagan27) have advocated (and claimed to identify 
in current doctrine) a “purposivist” approach that evaluates speech 
regulations based on whether they are motivated by the government’s 
hostility toward private speech, as opposed to some other neutral rea-
son. Such purposivism has great value in many areas of First Amend-
ment law, but it is not particularly useful in defining government view-
point. The aim of purposivist analysis is, after all, to identify invidious 
viewpoint discrimination, which is precisely what government speech 
doctrine permits. 
 The difficulty of defining government viewpoint suggests a second, 
somewhat exasperating, question: Is it even possible for the govern-
ment to have a viewpoint? The central assumption of government 
speech doctrine is that the government must be able to transmit mes-
sages without “distortion” by private speakers.28 Even so, many scholars, 
judges, and justices have argued persuasively that it is impossible, as 
both a practical and theoretical matter, to speak of a law or constitu-
tional provision as having a single coherent “purpose.”29 And if it is im-
possible for the government to have a single purpose when enacting a 
law, it seems equally impossible for it to have a particular viewpoint or 
message embodied in that law that is worth protecting through the 
constitutional exemption given to government speech. 
 This question flows into a third: Does current government speech 
doctrine actually require the government to have a viewpoint? This 
turns out to be a surprisingly interesting and difficult question. On the 
one hand, the rationale behind the government speech exception 
seems to require that the government have a viewpoint worth protect-
ing.30 On the other hand, as current doctrine does not even require 
the government to identify itself as a speaker,31 it is difficult to see how 
it could require the government to identify—or perhaps even to hold—
a viewpoint. And, if there is no such requirement, then there may be 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996). 
28 See Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government Speech When the 
Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1259, 1311 (2010) (arguing that courts 
must “restrict the application of the government speech doctrine to situations where the 
exercise of free speech rights by private citizens would thwart the government’s ability to 
communicate with the public”). 
29 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134; Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 288 F.3d at 619–20; 
Kagan, supra note 27, at 413–15; Post, supra note 17, at 181–83; infra notes 217–261 and 
accompanying text. 
30 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991); infra 
notes 262–307 and accompanying text. 
31 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7. 
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reason to doubt the theoretical justification for exempting government 
speech from the First Amendment in the first place. If the government 
is not expressing any kind of viewpoint, and cannot even show if and 
when it is expressing a viewpoint, then what is there to “protect” from 
distortion by private speakers? 
 And yet government speech, and specifically government expres-
sion of viewpoint, is not an unredeemable villain. To the contrary, “[i]t 
is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view 
. . . .”32 Moreover, not all incidents of government communication limit 
private expression in any meaningful way. A presidential press confer-
ence, for example, may be government speech, and it may limit private 
access to the President’s podium, but it does not seem like much of a 
restriction on the marketplace of ideas.33 Although the doctrine of gov-
ernment speech is somewhat troubling, the concept itself is not—the 
bathwater may need to be thoroughly changed, but we need not throw 
the baby out with it. Part III therefore offers a few preliminary thoughts 
about how to untangle the doctrinal and theoretical conflict without 
giving up entirely on government speech.34 The suggestions it proposes 
acknowledge both the necessity and the apparent incompatibility of 
viewpoint neutrality and government speech doctrine.35 To reconcile 
them, Part III builds on the notion of adequate alternatives that has 
long been central to time, place, and manner analysis and other First 
Amendment doctrines. At least three potential solutions emerge. First, 
the government speech defense could be limited to situations in which 
the government’s speech leaves adequate alternatives for private speak-
ers. Second, the defense could be limited to situations in which the 
government would otherwise lack adequate alternatives for communi-
cation. Finally, government speech could be allowed only where the 
government affirmatively provides equal alternatives for private speak-
ers against whose viewpoints it has discriminated. 
 These are but three solutions; others are possible.36 Ultimately, 
however, it is becoming increasingly important that one be selected. If 
the First Amendment is to maintain its claimed commitments to both 
viewpoint neutrality and government speech, then free speech theory 
                                                                                                                      
32 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). 
33 See Cole, supra note 17, at 703–04. 
34 See infra notes 308–404 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 308–404 and accompanying text. 
36 E.g., Cole, supra note 17, at 716; Post, supra note 17, at 152. 
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and doctrine must be able to accommodate their absolute but conflict-
ing demands. 
I. Private Viewpoints and Government Speech 
 Although there is very little agreement about the core “purpose” of 
the First Amendment,37 there is near unanimity that one such purpose— 
and certainly a core function—is to protect private viewpoints from gov-
ernment regulation. Thus the Amendment flatly prohibits the govern-
ment from engaging in viewpoint discrimination,38 even within classes 
of speech that could otherwise be completely proscribed.39 At the same 
time, the government’s expression of its own viewpoints is exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny, even where such expressions have the inci-
dental effect (or, arguably, the outright purpose) of limiting private 
speakers.40 And that paradox leads to the central puzzle with which this 
Article is concerned: government may not restrict speech simply be-
cause it disagrees with a particular viewpoint; and yet if it characterizes 
such a restriction as being the government’s own expression, it may be 
completely exempt from constitutional scrutiny.41 The first Part of this 
Article aims to flesh out this paradox, and to explain why and how the 
government’s viewpoint matters in analyzing government speech. Part 
I.A establishes the centrality of viewpoint neutrality to the purpose of 
the Free Speech Clause. Government speech, however, often contra-
venes this purpose. Part I.B examines the ways in which government 
speech limits private speech—by drowning it out, restraining it, or com-
pelling it—often in ways that are viewpoint based. 
                                                                                                                      
37 For a very, very small sampling, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 105 
(1980) (focusing on the value of the First Amendment to political democracy); Alexander 
Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 79 (1960) (“The guarantee given by the First Amendment 
is not, then, assured to all speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indi-
rectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal—only, therefore, to the consideration of 
matters of public interest.”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 
594 (1982) (emphasizing importance of individual efforts to obtain “self-realization”); Tho-
mas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 215–20 (1972) (focus-
ing on individuals’ “autonomy” interests). 
38 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
39 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992) (holding that a state 
may not selectively ban fighting words on the basis of viewpoint, even though it may ban 
fighting words entirely). 
40 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
41 See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009). 
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A. Protecting Private Viewpoints Is a Primary Purpose of the Free Speech Clause 
 The first rule of free speech theory and doctrine is that the gov-
ernment may not discriminate against a particular viewpoint based sim-
ply on its disagreement with that viewpoint.42 As the Supreme Court has 
stated: “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, 
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”43 
 This principle is more than a rhetorical commitment; it is mani-
fested in many of the First Amendment’s most recognizable rules.44 In 
1992, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that even speech which might otherwise be flatly prohibited—in 
other words, speech that falls outside the reach of the First Amend-
ment—may not be treated differently on the basis of the viewpoint it 
expresses.45 Thus, for example, the state can ban all fighting words,46 
but not only those fighting words directed at Democrats.47 Put simply: 
“The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility—or 
favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”48 The Court 
has suggested that a speech regulation may be held unconstitutional if 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
43 Id. 
44 See Kagan, supra note 27, at 443. 
45 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383–84. In R.A.V., the majority stated: 
What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First 
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (ob-
scenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely in-
visible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content 
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the 
government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content dis-
crimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government. 
Id.; see id. at 406 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although the First Amendment 
does not apply to categories of unprotected speech, such as fighting words, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires that the regulation of unprotected speech be rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.”). 
46 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words-those which by their very ut-
terance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 
Id. 
47 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391–92. 
48 Id. at 386; see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (“Where the government prohibits conduct precisely because of its 
communicative attributes, we hold the regulation unconstitutional.”). 
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viewpoint discrimination is so much as a part of the motivation for pass-
ing it.49 Even those First Amendment rules that say nothing about pro-
tecting viewpoints may in fact be designed to smoke out bad govern-
ment purposes and identify viewpoint discrimination.50 For example, 
First Amendment doctrine supposedly draws a distinction between 
viewpoint-based restrictions (which, of course, the Amendment flatly 
forbids) and “content”-based restrictions (which may be acceptable in 
some circumstances).51 And yet, the boundary between content and 
viewpoint discrimination is more slippery than at first it might seem.52 
As Richard Fallon notes, “many content-based and effects-based tests 
can reasonably be viewed as surrogates for purpose tests.”53 Content-
based tests, in other words, may in fact provide mechanisms for deter-
mining whether the governmental purpose behind a law is impermissi-
ble—whether, for example, it is premised on viewpoint discrimination. 
 Free speech scholars—not by nature an agreeable bunch—have 
for the most part endorsed the primacy of the viewpoint neutrality 
principle: “[V]irtually all of the leading theories would find it imper-
missible—albeit for different reasons—for the government to attempt 
to stifle communication based on its hostility to particular ideas.”54 
Viewpoint neutrality and the relationship between public and private 
viewpoints play a particularly interesting role in the “purposivist” ap-
proach to the First Amendment.55 Advocating such an approach, then-
                                                                                                                      
49 See Kagan, supra note 27, at 443 (“Let us accept that the First Amendment prohibits 
restrictions on speech stemming, even in part, from hostility, sympathy, or self-interest.”); 
see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (“[R]egulation of com-
munication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being ex-
pressed by the communicator.” (emphasis added)). 
50 See Kagan, supra note 27, at 414–15. 
51 See id. at 443 (“The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regula-
tions of speech serves as the keystone of First Amendment law.”). 
52 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) 
(stating that the distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination “is not a precise 
one”); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 
84, 105 (1998) (“[I]t is hardly clear that the line between viewpoint and other forms of 
content discrimination can be sustained, except possibly in extreme cases.”). 
53 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 94 (1997). 
54 Fallon, supra note 53, at 100; see Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Soci-
ety 195–97 (1992) (stating that viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally impermissi-
ble); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Artistic Freedom, Public Funding, and the Constitution, in Public 
Money and the Muse: Essays on Government Funding for the Arts 80, 89–90 (Ste-
phen Benedict ed., 1991) (arguing that viewpoint discrimination is a “cardinal sin against 
the First Amendment” even when used to make decisions about the receipt of government 
funds); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With 
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593, 611–12 (1990). 
55 See Kagan, supra note 27, at 414. 
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professor Elena Kagan argued that “most of First Amendment doctrine 
constitutes a highly, but necessarily, complex scheme for ascertaining 
the governmental purposes underlying regulations of speech.”56 Jed 
Rubenfeld similarly argued that the solution to the First Amendment’s 
“doctrinal problems . . . is not complicated. All the difficulties disap-
pear as soon as First Amendment analysis takes up what the Supreme 
Court has ostensibly sought to foreclose: an open and direct inquiry 
into the law’s purpose.”57 
 The viewpoint neutrality principle clearly applies where the gov-
ernment totally forbids the expression of a disfavored viewpoint.58 But 
it also applies where the private viewpoint is partially stifled, rather than 
totally silenced.59 After all, the principle that “[t]he government may 
not regulate [speech] based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the 
underlying message expressed”60 is not the same as the notion that the 
government may regulate speech based on hostility towards the under-
lying message so long as it does not completely mute the message.61 
Part III.B.1 evaluates whether partial government regulation of speech 
that, although grounded in government hostility to the message, 
amounts to only a partial restriction might be a doctrinal solution to 
the theoretical problems with government speech doctrine.62 Even if 
such partial stifling were permissible, it would not be the same as saying 
that government speech is not a viewpoint-based regulation of private 
speech. At the very least, if the purposivists are correct and what mat-
ters is the motivation behind a speech regulation (i.e., whether it tar-
                                                                                                                      
56 Kagan, supra note 27, at 516; see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and 
Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 127 (noting, though 
not necessarily endorsing, the notion that “the form of a regulation—content-specific or 
content-neutral—matters mostly as evidence of its purpose, but purpose is the predomi-
nant consideration”). 
57 Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 768 (2001); see 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 297, 332 
(1997) (arguing that although the flag-burning cases “used the language of strict scrutiny, 
these cases are clearly about illegitimate purposes”); Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restric-
tions of Speech and the First Amendment: A Motive-Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court’s 
Jurisprudence, 12 Const. Comment. 401, 420 (1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court seems to have 
chosen a fairly coherent and sensible (albeit somewhat unexplicit) middle path: Incidental 
restrictions sometimes raise a First Amendment concern, depending on the likelihood of a 
speech-suppressive administrative motivation.”). 
58 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. 
59 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (applying rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions to a public demonstration). 
60 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386. 
61 See infra notes 343–367 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra notes 343–367 and accompanying text. 
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gets a particular viewpoint), then it should not matter whether the ef-
fect of the regulation is to silence the viewpoint’s expression completely 
or simply to burden it. 
 Of course, like everything even tangentially related to the First 
Amendment, it may properly be questioned whether commitment to 
the principle of viewpoint neutrality has been more rhetorical than re-
al.63 It is part of the project of this Article to argue that the commit-
ment is certainly not real, and that the more tightly we embrace gov-
ernment speech doctrine the less we can even think of it as rhetorical. 
In any event, it suffices to say that—real or not—viewpoint neutrality 
has long been thought to be an animating principle of First Amendment 
doctrine, and in a broader sense it undoubtedly is an animating princi-
ple of our First Amendment culture.64 
 The First Amendment is like a scholarly Midas: every rule it touch-
es turns to theory. And yet the bar on viewpoint discrimination itself 
does not vary according to one’s preferred First Amendment theory, 
nor—with the glaring exception of government speech doctrine—do 
courts vary in their avowed obeisance to it.65 The viewpoint neutrality 
requirement is therefore both fundamental to free speech and agnostic 
to free speech theory. 
B. Government Speech Limits Private Speech on the Basis of Viewpoint 
 This Section addresses and explores a simple but under-recognized 
proposition: government speech often (albeit not always) limits private 
expression. It may not totally forbid a private speaker from expressing a 
particular viewpoint, but it either forces people to express viewpoints 
they do not support or prevents them from expressing viewpoints they 
do. Government speech cases, after all, arise when a private individual 
whose speech has been limited brings a First Amendment challenge, 
and the government relies on government speech doctrine as a de-
                                                                                                                      
63 To take just one example, “the Court’s First Amendment doctrine already permits 
government employers to make viewpoint-specific distinctions when punishing on-duty 
speech that may disrupt workplace operations—such as speech critical of a government 
employer.” Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its 
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 62 (2009). See generally Daniel A. 
Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context 
in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1219 (1984). 
64 See Smolla, supra note 54, at 195–97. 
65 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–29; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–94 (1991); 
Cole, supra note 17, at 680–81; Sullivan, supra note 56, at 127–28; infra notes 327–404 and 
accompanying text. 
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fense.66 Of course, not all of these challenges succeed, and not all gov-
ernment speech directly limits private expression. Government-spon- 
sored anti-drug advertisements and presidential press conferences, for 
example, do not meaningfully limit private speakers.67 For precisely that 
reason, however, those situations are generally not implicated in gov-
ernment speech cases.68 Moreover, it is not impossible to preserve these 
important and useful incidents of government speech while still recog-
nizing that the doctrine limits private viewpoints in other circumstances. 
 Recasting government speech as a limitation on private speech 
demonstrates the futility of asking whether a particular action is gov-
ernment speech “or” a regulation of private speech in a public forum.69 
There are not two sides to the coin. And even if there were, flipping it 
would do no good; it would stubbornly land on its edge each time. Far 
better simply to recognize that government speech often is a limitation 
(even if not a total ban) on private expression, and to deal honestly and 
straightforwardly with the consequences. Perhaps the most serious of 
these is the central problem this Article addresses: the fact that gov-
ernment speech involves government expression of viewpoint. Because 
government speech often amounts to speech regulation, and is itself 
viewpoint-based, it follows that government speech is a viewpoint-based 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
67 See Cole, supra note 17, at 703–04. 
68 See id. 
69 See generally Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and 
Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 953 (1998) (analyzing the First 
Amendment protections available for speech that the government, as a “secondary” 
speech entity speaking through individuals, “selects”). 
An entire federal circuit tore out its collective hair over this exact problem. In 2002, in 
Summum v. City of Ogden (City of Ogden), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that permanent monuments on the lawn of a municipal building constituted a 
nonpublic forum. 297 F.3d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 2002). In 2006, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Utah in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City relied on the reasoning in City of Og-
den to conclude that the public park was a nonpublic forum in which content-based re-
strictions were permissible if reasonable and viewpoint neutral. See Summum, 483 F.3d at 
1051–52; City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 1002. On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit disagreed, 
striking down the city’s action on the grounds that the park constituted a public forum 
and that the exclusion of the monument did not meet strict scrutiny. Summum, 483 F.3d at 
1050–52. A divided vote of the Tenth Circuit refused to rehear that conclusion en banc. 
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007). Judge Carlos F. 
Lucero dissented from the denial of rehearing, arguing that the park was a limited public 
forum and not a public forum. Id. at 1171 (Lucero, J., dissenting). Judge Michael W. 
McConnell also dissented, arguing that the monuments were government speech. Id. at 
1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately 
reversed, largely for the reasons advocated by Judge McConnell. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 
1138. 
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regulation on speech. This Section attempts to establish that proposi-
tion; Part II attempts to deal with the consequences. 
1. Government Speech Limits Private Speech 
 Government speech is not, strictly speaking, a First Amendment 
“right” of the government,70 but rather a doctrine that allows the gov-
ernment to justify what otherwise might be unconstitutional interfer-
ence with private speakers. Drawing this distinction is important be-
cause the very concept of “government speech” seems to suggest that 
government actors, like private speakers, may seek constitutional pro-
tection from speech regulations—in other words, that the government 
can raise First Amendment claims against itself.71 Instead, government 
speech doctrine provides a defense to First Amendment challenges 
brought by private individuals whose speech has been limited by the 
government.72 Government speech itself can therefore limit private 
speech in at least two ways: by drowning it out or, perhaps less recog-
nized but more troubling, by explicitly regulating it. 
a. Government Speech Drowns Out Private Speech 
 By now it is well recognized that protecting government speech 
means running the risk that the government will drown out dissenting 
private voices due to the volume of its voice and the power of the out-
lets through which it can communicate.73 This was one of the insights 
of the first major scholarly work on government speech, Mark Yudof’s 
When Government Speaks, which preceded the first major government 
speech case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Rust v. Sullivan, 
by almost a decade.74 Yudof contended that the government “speaks” 
in all kinds of unrecognized and underappreciated ways, from dissemi-
nating health warnings to setting public school curricula.75 He noted 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 17, at 1508 (“[V]iewing government as a First 
Amendment right holder is not supported by, and is inconsistent with, the text of the First 
Amendment and the purposes underlying the text.”). 
71 See Yudof, supra note 24, at 6–10. 
72 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
73 Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government 
Speech?, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 961, 961–62 (1984) (“A prominent theme in this ‘government 
speech’ debate is that the government’s powerful voice can easily overwhelm weaker pri-
vate voices, creating a monopoly of ideas and inhibiting the dialectic on which we rely to 
reach decisions.” (internal citations omitted)). 
74 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. See generally Yudof, supra note 24. 
75 Yudof, supra note 24, at 6–10 (describing various ways in which the government can 
speak). 
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that government speech can drown out private voices, and that it has 
the democracy-distorting effect of creating a “falsified majority” by us-
ing government communication to ensure support for government 
policies.76 Yudof’s concern, in other words, was not with the legal effect 
of government speech doctrine—which was not yet a glimmer in the 
justices’ eyes—but with the practical effect of government speech. 
                                                                                                                     
 The reason for this practical problem is not difficult to perceive. 
The government has access to methods of speech that the rest of us do 
not—platforms such as presidential press conferences,77 for example, 
and subtler but perhaps more powerful mechanisms such as school 
curricula.78 So long as government’s use of these mechanisms is trans-
parent,79 any harm to the market may be minimized—people can iden-
tify the government’s voice and, if they disagree with its message, vote 
out the governmental actors responsible.80 And yet the problem does 
not entirely disappear, because the “political” solution is itself imper-
fect. If the Democrat-controlled Department of Education decided that 
all federally funded schoolchildren should be taught that Republicans 
are vile racists, Republicans would presumably not be satisfied to know 
that they could change the curriculum (and thus the government’s 
speech) simply by winning more elections. In other words, the gov-
ernment’s unique position in the marketplace of ideas carries with it 
special risks of distortion and dominance, risks that are multiplied by 
the expansion of government speech doctrine. 
 
76 Id. at 31–37, 152–57. 
77 See Cole, supra note 17, at 703–04; Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum 
and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 Hastings Const. L.Q. 
71, 116–17 (2004). 
78 See Cole, supra note 17, at 715. 
79 One of the most notable shortcomings of current government speech doctrine is 
that it fails to require such transparency, a point made at length by others. See, e.g., Johanns, 
544 U.S. at 571–72 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lee, supra note 17, at 988 (“[W]hen the gov-
ernment participates in public debate, it should make the fact of its participation trans-
parent.”). As Justice Souter has written: 
[I]f government relies on the government-speech doctrine to compel specific 
groups to fund speech with targeted taxes, it must make itself politically ac-
countable by indicating that the content actually is a government message, 
not just the statement of one self-interested group the government is cur-
rently willing to invest with power. 
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 571–72 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
80 For more on the feasibility of the “political solution” to the government speech 
problem, see infra notes 130–142 and accompanying text. 
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b. Government Speech Is Akin to Speech Regulation 
 Government speech raises a second threat, one that is less recog-
nized but theoretically and doctrinally more nefarious than the first: 
even holding aside the distortive power of the government’s speech, 
government speech doctrine permits the government to directly limit 
the speech of private individuals.81 In that way, the problem is not one 
of distortion but of speech regulation, plain and simple. As Steven Gey 
rightly notes, “[o]ne feature of the Court’s most recent government 
speech cases is that when the Court gives the government the right to 
speak, the Court simultaneously gives the government the right to si-
lence private speakers who disagree with the government.”82 
 The posture of government speech cases illustrates the problem. 
Such cases arise, almost inevitably, in situations where a private party has 
been prevented from speaking in his or her chosen method or setting. In 
other words, holding aside those relatively rare cases involving govern-
ment speech that is itself constitutionally prohibited (speech that vio-
lates the Establishment Clause is the only clear example83), government 
speech actually involves limitations on private speech. Thus it makes 
sense that almost all of the Supreme Court’s government speech cases 
originated when private parties wished to speak and were told that they 
could not: for example, doctors in the 1991 case of Rust v. Sullivan who 
wanted to give their patients information about abortion;84 lawyers in 
the 2001 case of Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez who wanted to argue for 
changes in government entitlement programs;85 and most recently, 
members of a religious order in the 2009 case of Pleasant Grove City, Utah 
v. Summum who wanted to erect a monument celebrating their Seven 
Aphorisms.86 In each of those cases, the government informed private 
parties that they could not engage in their preferred expression, and in 
two cases the government prevailed.87 Velazquez is the exception, and the 
                                                                                                                      
 
81 See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1637, 
1640 (2006) (“Government can speak, but its possession of coercive authority along with 
its ability to shape public discourse makes it unlike any other speaker.”). 
82 Gey, supra note 28, at 1268–69. 
83 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“For even if the Free Speech 
Clause neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by 
the Constitution’s other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and 
Equal Protection Clauses.”); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553; Park, supra note 2, at 145. 
84 500 U.S. at 192. 
85 531 U.S. at 542–43. 
86 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30. 
87 See id. at 1138 (holding that the selection of privately donated monuments in a pub-
lic park constituted government speech); Rust, 500 U.S. at 193–94 (holding that prohibi-
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Court’s opinion in that case suggests that its ruling was largely limited by 
the specific context of the attorney-client relationship.88 
 Government speech thus involves the government entering and 
effectively occupying “private” spheres of discourse. At oral argument in 
Summum, the government’s attorney embraced this point, arguing that 
government speech “turns on control, right? So once the Government 
takes control of something, says this is our speech, then it’s the Gov-
ernment speaking.”89 And just as the Fifth Amendment does not recog-
nize half-takings,90 government speech doctrine recognizes either private 
or public speech, but not a hybrid of the two (much to the chagrin of 
some scholars91 and Supreme Court justices92). In other words, once 
the government is speaking, speakers cannot assert any First Amend-
ment claim to stop it from doing so, nor do they have a First Amend-
ment right to oppose the government’s speech by whatever method they 
choose. Of course, private speakers remain free to agree or disagree 
with the content of the government’s message. But they cannot express 
that disagreement in their preferred way, much like Suzette Kelo re-
mains free to live in a house, just not the one whose physical taking the 
Supreme Court upheld in the 2005 case of Kelo v. City of New London.93 
 No matter how one characterizes the government and private in-
terests at stake, the basic conclusion is unavoidable: government speech 
                                                                                                                      
tions on counseling, referral, and provision of information about abortion as a condition 
for healthcare providers to receive Title X government funding constituted government 
speech). But see Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547–49 (holding unconstitutional a condition on 
funding that prevented Legal Services Corporation-funded attorneys from addressing the 
validity of welfare laws). 
88 531 U.S. at 542–43 (“The advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by 
the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a gen-
erous understanding of the concept. In this vital respect this suit is distinguishable from 
Rust.”). 
89 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07–665), 2008 WL 
4892845, at *32. 
90 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1991); 
see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
91 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 607 (2008) (“We generally characterize speech as either private or 
governmental, and this dichotomy is embedded in First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
92 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 10–11 ( Justice Souter: “Isn’t the 
tough issue here the claim that there is—is in fact a mixture, that it is both Government 
and private[?]”); id. at 23–24 ( Justice Breyer: “[T]he problem I have is that we seem to be 
applying these subcategories in a very absolute way. Why can’t we call this what it is—it’s a 
mixture of private speech with Government decisionmaking . . . ?”). 
93 See 545 U.S. 469, 488–90 (2005) (holding that the city of New London’s decision to 
take private property for economic development satisfied the Fifth Amendment’s public 
use requirement); Rust, 500 U.S. at 193–94. 
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directly limits private speech.94 Whether that limitation is justifiable, or 
whether it simply represents the permissible denial of a subsidy, is a 
separate question addressed in more detail below.95 
c. Government Speech Is Akin to Compelled Speech 
 There is another side to the relationship between government 
speech and private expression, one that is equally problematic as a mat-
ter of First Amendment doctrine: government speech not only limits 
private speech, but it also sometimes compels it. 
 In landmark cases like Wooley v. Maynard in 197796 and West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette in 1943,97 the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely 
and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”98 As a practical matter, a 
private speaker will probably only bring a First Amendment challenge if 
he or she has been forced to express a viewpoint he or she does not 
support. But compelled speech may be impermissible whether or not it 
expresses a particular “viewpoint” with which the compelled speaker 
disagrees.99 
 The relationship between government speech and compelled 
speech is a complicated one, in part because so many government ac-
tions effectively “compel” taxpayers to “express” messages with which 
they disagree. Of course, the First Amendment cannot give all taxpay-
ers a right to withhold funds for programs they do not support, or else 
government itself would grind to a halt.100 The limitations on taxpayer 
                                                                                                                      
94 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193–94. 
95 See infra notes 96–114 and accompanying text. 
96 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713–14, 717 (1977). 
97 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
98 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633–34). 
99 Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 21, at 
1300 (arguing that the ban on compelled speech “can rationally exist” even if the right 
against viewpoint discrimination were to be “peeled away”). The same passage goes on to 
argue that the prevention against compelled speech “is a more central element of freedom 
of speech” than the ban on viewpoint discrimination, and that it is in fact “the core free 
speech right.” Id. But for all the reasons given in Part I.A, it seems to me that viewpoint 
discrimination is a far more central—and common—First Amendment concern. See supra 
notes 42–65 and accompanying text. 
100 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern, government has to say 
something, and a First Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced contribution to raising the 
government’s voice in the marketplace of ideas would be out of the question.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
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standing go a long way towards preventing this problem from arising,101 
and the government speech cases go even further by recasting govern-
ment programs as government speech free from the usual ban on 
compelled speech. In 2005, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, for 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the case of a group of 
beef producers who objected to the requirement that they pay a certain 
amount of money each year to the Beef Council, a government-run 
organization responsible for the familiar “Beef. It’s What’s For Dinner” 
advertisements and other pro-beef propaganda.102 These particular 
beef producers claimed that they did not agree with this message be-
cause it failed to differentiate their own products, such as grain-fed beef 
or other specialty meats.103 They argued that by forcing them to fund 
and associate with a message they did not support, the compulsory ad-
vertising amounted to compelled speech.104 But in keeping with the 
basic notion that government speech operates as an exception to oth-
erwise rigid rules of free speech doctrine, a divided Court held that the 
beef advertisements were the government’s own speech and therefore 
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.105 In other words, despite the 
fact that the ads amounted to viewpoint-specific compelled speech, 
government speech doctrine blocked private individuals from success-
fully invoking the principle of viewpoint neutrality. 
 On that note, it should be emphasized that much of what passes for 
compelled speech could just as accurately be described as viewpoint-
based limitations on speech. Along with Barnette, which struck down a 
school’s requirement that students recite the Pledge of Allegiance,106 
Wooley is generally seen as the origin of the prohibition on compelled 
speech. In Wooley, the plaintiff, George Maynard, used tape to cover the 
words “Live Free or Die” on his state-issued New Hampshire license 
plate because he “consider[ed] the . . . motto to be repugnant to [his] 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (limiting taxpayer standing to Estab-
lishment Clause violations and a few other narrowly defined scenarios); see also Hein v. 
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 615 (2007) (declining to extend Flast’s 
“narrow exception” to the taxpayer standing rule). 
102 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553–56. 
103 Id. at 556. 
104 Id. at 564. 
105 Id. at 560, 564–65 (rejecting respondent’s various arguments that the promotional 
campaign was not government speech). 
106 319 U.S. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag 
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the 
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Consti-
tution to reserve from all official control.”). 
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moral, religious, and political beliefs.”107 He was fined for doing so, and 
brought a First Amendment challenge.108 The Supreme Court held in 
his favor on the grounds that being forced to display the state motto on 
his license plate effectively compelled Maynard to express a message 
with which he did not agree.109 Citing Barnette, the Court emphasized 
that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment 
against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right 
to refrain from speaking at all.”110 Wooley was decided well before Rust 
and its progeny, so the Court did not address whether the government 
has some kind of speech “right” to express its motto on license plates. 
 Although it is probably true that having the state motto embla-
zoned on his license plate forced Maynard to express something against 
his will, that is not the only way to conceptualize the First Amendment 
harm he suffered, nor is it necessarily the best one. After all, it could 
just as easily be said that the motto conveyed no message at all because 
anyone seeing it would know that Maynard was required to have a li-
cense plate on his car and that the act of doing so was therefore non-
volitional and unexpressive. But even if the license plate itself conveyed 
no message, that would not mean that Maynard had no First Amend-
ment claims. Whether or not he was forced to say something with which 
he disagreed, Maynard was prevented from engaging in expressive con-
duct—the act of covering up the motto on his license plate.111 Thus his 
claim was not only one of compelled speech, but also of speech regula-
tion. 
 Nor is this the only interesting complication in the compelled 
speech/government speech interface. If the Wooley-Barnette principle is 
extended to cover government speakers, then it would seem that the 
government has a right to prevent “ventriloquism”—to avoid, in other 
words, having private speech mistakenly attributed to it.112 New Hamp-
shire, for example, might argue that Maynard’s defaced license plate 
conveyed the misleading message that the state had no pride in its mot-
to, thus “compelling” the government to express a viewpoint it did not 
hold. Although the Supreme Court has yet to rest a holding squarely on 
                                                                                                                      
107 430 U.S. at 707. 
108 Id. at 708. 
109 See id. at 713. 
110 Id. at 714 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633–34). 
111 See id. at 713 (citing the district court’s framing of the harm Maynard suffered as 
suppression of individual, symbolic expression). 
112 See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 49–52 (2000); Nor-
ton, supra note 4, at 1323–24. 
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this principle, it has caught the attention of some appellate judges113 
and is of special interest to those judges and scholars who would recog-
nize a category of “hybrid” speech that is simultaneously private and 
governmental.114 
 Thus, even compelled speech can effectively be recast as speech 
regulation, which in turn means that cases like Johanns are in many 
ways equivalent to those like Summum. The result is that whether con-
ceived as regulations of private speech or as compelled speech, gov-
ernment speech represents the kind of viewpoint-based interference 
with private speakers that is generally thought to raise problems under 
the Free Speech Clause. 
2. Government Speech Limitations Are Often Viewpoint Specific 
 In Summum, the Supreme Court warned that government speech 
doctrine should “not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain pri-
vate speakers over others based on viewpoint.”115 The justices can rest 
easy: no “subterfuge” is necessary, for the doctrine is refreshingly trans-
parent in this regard. Its very raison d’être is to “favor[] certain private 
speakers over others based on viewpoint.” The point cannot be over-
stressed: the function, and often the purpose, of government speech 
doctrine is to disfavor private speakers as a result of their viewpoints.116 
No matter how one conceptualizes the limitations that government 
speech places on private speech—as drowning out, restraining, or 
compelling it—private speech that is affected will be that with which 
the government disagrees. 
 This is not some unforeseeable or avoidable byproduct of govern-
ment speech. It is the very heart of the doctrine. Consider what would 
have happened if Pleasant Grove City had justified its rejection of the 
                                                                                                                      
113 See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 252 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of re-
hearing en banc) (“I would have hoped, if rehearing were granted, that we would consider 
the government’s interest in avoiding ‘speech by attribution;’ that is, the government’s 
right not to be compelled to speak by private citizens.”); Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., 
Inc. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 827 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing a school’s in-
terest in “disassociating itself from speech inconsistent with its educational mission and 
avoiding the appearance of endorsing views, no matter who the speaker is”). 
114 See generally Corbin, supra note 91 (advocating for recognition of “mixed speech” as 
a category). 
115 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
116 As Part III.A discusses in more detail, government speech can also be justified on 
the basis of the government’s need to convey information, not viewpoints. See infra notes 
315–326 and accompanying text. This Section focuses on the latter. 
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Summum monument on some viewpoint-neutral ground—because it 
would interfere with soccer games in the park, for example. In that 
case, the Summum would, somewhat paradoxically, have had a stronger 
First Amendment claim. At the very least, the city would have had to 
satisfy the time, place, and manner test, which requires the government 
to show that a regulation is content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and preserves adequate alternative 
channels of expression.117 But because the city claimed that the mon-
ument’s message would have interfered with its own, it was able to 
avoid even this relatively forgiving standard.118 Indeed, from a free 
speech perspective, the government speech tag is a fate worse even 
than the nonpublic forum label119 because at least the latter requires 
viewpoint neutrality.120 In 2002, in Summum v. City of Ogden, in fact, a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in Sum-
mum’s favor despite characterizing the park as a nonpublic forum be-
cause the city’s action was not viewpoint neutral.121 
 In other words, government speech doctrine alters a fundamental 
assumption of First Amendment doctrine. For decades it has been 
thought that the best way to save a speech regulation from constitu-
tional challenge was to characterize it as viewpoint neutral.122 Under 
government speech doctrine, however, one can avoid First Amendment 
scrutiny altogether by embracing the fact that a regulation is viewpoint 
specific.123 One answer to this apparent problem might be that in gov-
ernment speech cases the government is not seeking to limit dissenting 
                                                                                                                      
117 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. By invoking the test, I do not mean to endorse it. There are 
problems with the time, place, and manner approach that are far beyond the scope of this 
Article to address. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 
1249, 1261 (1995) (describing the test’s application as “an unmitigated disaster”). 
118 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137. I believe it quite likely that the city could have pre-
vailed under a time, place, and manner analysis for precisely the same reasons as it pre-
vailed under government speech doctrine—allowing a proliferation of monuments would 
create clutter and effectively close the park to all private speakers. See id.; see also supra note 
117. 
119 Cf. Gey, supra note 28, at 1306 (noting that, “[f]rom a free-speech perspective,” a 
court’s characterization of a state specialty license plate program as government speech 
would be the worst possible outcome because it would permit some controversial ideologi-
cal messages in the prime expressive forum, but only those with which the government 
agrees). 
120 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78 (1998) (distin-
guishing between nonpublic forums, in which viewpoint neutrality is required, and gov-
ernment enterprises that are not forums, in which it is not). 
121 See City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1002, 1006. 
122 See Fallon, supra note 53, at 91–92; Sunstein, supra note 54, at 611–12. 
123 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138. 
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viewpoints, but rather to express its own. And yet the very nature of 
government speech doctrine makes it almost impossible to draw a line 
between the government’s expression of its own viewpoints and the 
suppression of those with which it disagrees. That is, government 
speech permits—indeed rewards—the disfavoring, if not outright si-
lencing, of private viewpoints that would interfere with the govern-
ment’s own expression.124 Inevitably, the private viewpoints that will be 
silenced are those with which the government disagrees. Thus it might 
be said with some force that the purpose, and not merely the function, 
of government speech doctrine is to censor certain private viewpoints. 
 At risk of belaboring the point: no one need worry that govern-
ment speech will be used as “subterfuge for favoring certain private 
speakers over others.”125 The current doctrine encourages government 
to be open, consistent, and sincere in its effort to do so. That said, a 
final word of qualification may be appropriate. Although the discussion 
here has focused on the many ways in which government speech dis-
criminates against private viewpoints, there also might be situations in 
which it is either viewpoint neutral or nondiscriminatory.126 For exam-
ple, to the degree that the government seeks only to inform citizens 
about a national emergency, it may not be expressing a “viewpoint” on 
any particular controversy.127 And, when the President takes the po-
dium to present the State of the Union address, it may be argued that 
he is not in any meaningful sense “discriminating” against private 
speakers, even though they cannot occupy the podium at the same 
time.128 These are strong points, not to be taken lightly, and are ad-
dressed in more detail in Part III.B.129 
3. A Transparency Requirement Would Lessen the Problem, but Would 
Not Solve It 
 It has been argued that transparency is, or at least should be, the 
hallmark of government speech doctrine.130 So long as the government 
                                                                                                                      
124 See Bezanson, supra note 69, at 959 (discussing government-as-editor cases and con-
cluding that “[t]he idea that an editor is ‘free’ to exercise editorial judgment without the 
capacity to engage in viewpoint discrimination is vacuous”). 
125 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134. 
126 See infra notes 262–307 and accompanying text. 
127 See Cole, supra note 17, at 681; infra notes 262–307 and accompanying text. 
128 See Cole, supra note 17, at 703–04. 
129 See infra notes 327–404 and accompanying text. 
130 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 
(2000); Lee, supra note 17, at 988; Norton, supra note 17, at 597. 
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identifies itself when speaking, the public can hold government speak-
ers politically accountable and curb their excesses.131 Thus the Su-
preme Court has said that “[w]hen the government speaks, for instance 
to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the 
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its ad-
vocacy.”132 
 There is, however, a well-recognized flaw in this supposed political 
solution: government speech doctrine does not require the govern-
ment to identify itself when speaking.133 As a result, voters will not nec-
essarily even know when the government is speaking, and therefore 
cannot hold it accountable for whatever message it is conveying. This 
was the major issue that divided the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Johanns.134 Justice Souter—whose unease with government speech doc-
trine continued right up through his concurring opinion in Sum-
mum135—argued in dissent that “if government relies on the govern-
ment speech doctrine to compel specific groups to fund speech with 
targeted taxes, it must make itself politically accountable by indicating 
that the content actually is a government message.”136 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, responded that “the dissent cites no prior prac-
tice, no precedent, and no authority for this highly refined elabora-
tion—not even anyone who has ever before thought of it.”137 
 But many scholars have supported Justice Souter’s position and 
argued (rightly, in my opinion) for a functional transparency require-
ment, which would enable voters to respond to, and control, govern-
ment speech.138 This kind of political process solution has much to rec-
ommend it. It would surely go a long way towards ensuring that 
messages the government claims to be expressing in the name of voters 
are messages the voters actually support. And if the government must 
                                                                                                                      
131 See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235. 
132 See id. 
133 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (rejecting Summum’s suggestion that the city be re-
quired to pass an ordinance formally adopting the other monuments in the park); Johanns, 
544 U.S. at 553–55 (concluding that beef advertisements constituted government speech 
even though they only stated “Funded by America’s Beef Producers”); see also Post, supra 
note 17, at 172–75 (noting that, after the Rust Court upheld regulations requiring health 
care professionals to respond to inquiries about abortion by saying that it was not recom-
mended, patients might well attribute the government’s views to their doctors). 
134 Compare 544 U.S. at 564 n.7, with 544 U.S. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
135 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) (advocating a “reasonable 
observer” test for determining when monuments are government speech). 
136 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 571 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
137 Id. at 564 n.7. 
138 See Lee, supra note 17, at 988; Norton, supra note 17, at 597. 
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have the power to impose viewpoint-based limitations on private 
speech, then surely, at the very least, it would make sense for the gov-
ernment to identify itself when doing so. 
 But even if the Court does eventually incorporate a transparency 
requirement, that development alone will not solve the problem of 
government speech. Government speech doctrine must not only be 
attuned to the issue of government transparency, but also to the very 
real issue of viewpoint neutrality.139 The doctrine must be sensitive to 
the issue of government viewpoint because democratic control of the 
political process is not the only value threatened by government speech 
and it likewise cannot be the only solution.140 The majority is almost 
certain to agree with the government’s message, and therefore does not 
suffer the specific harms of government speech, unless elected officials 
have misjudged public opinion. Rather, the harm is to the dissenting 
minority that wishes to be heard, but whose First Amendment claim 
fails because the government asserts the government speech de-
fense.141 In that instance, what the would-be private speaker has suf-
fered is not a failure of the political process, but simple viewpoint dis-
im
f employing the 
remedy because they lack the needed political power. 
                                                                                                                     
cr ination. 
 The political factors that lead to such discrimination are not diffi-
cult to comprehend. The government is rarely in the business of mak-
ing unpopular statements; elected officials likely understand their role 
as expressing and effectuating voters’ viewpoints and desires.142 Unless 
the legislature has simply misjudged public opinion, as it sometimes 
does, it is almost certain that the government’s speech is popular. Thus, 
the only people with the clout to invoke the political process solution— 
the voting majority—are those who have no interest in employing it. 
Meanwhile, the minority dissenters—those who have been silenced by 
the invocation of government speech—have no hope o
 
139 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (“Respondent voices the legitimate concern that the 
government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain private 
speakers over others based on viewpoint.”). 
140 See id. 
141 See id.; see also Yudof, supra note 24, at 31–37, 152–57. 
142 See Ely, supra note 37, at 135 (“No matter how open the process, those with most of 
the votes are in a position to vote themselves advantages at the expense of the others, or 
otherwise to refuse to take their interests into account.”). 
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C. Government Speech as Government “Subsidy” 
 One response to the government speech problem described here 
is to deny its existence by saying that the “regulations” it involves are 
nothing more than permissible viewpoint-based allocations of govern-
ment subsidies.143 Surely, the argument goes, there is a difference be-
tween the government choosing to limit those speakers with whom it 
does not agree and choosing to support those speakers with whom it 
does.144 But despite its intuitive appeal, it is unclear that such a distinc-
tion can be maintained and even less clear that it compels us to permit 
viewpoint discrimination for the latter, but not for the former. Indeed, 
the longer one contemplates the question, the more it becomes clear 
int-based 
, they are 
o 
     
that government speech cannot be distinguished from viewpo
discrimination in any meaningful way. Like an optical illusion
tw distinct things at once. 
1. The Subsidy Characterization Does Not Solve the Problem 
 The first, and perhaps most attractive, way to avoid the govern-
ment speech/viewpoint neutrality paradox is to deny that any paradox 
exists at all: the government speech cases do not involve “regulation,” 
let alone viewpoint-based discrimination, because the government has 
not deprived private speakers of anything that was ever theirs. The 
Summum, for example, never had a right to speak in Pleasant Grove 
City’s park, and therefore no speech right was regulated in that case.145 
imiS larly, Congress was under no obligation to fund any doctors’ 
speech, and thus the doctors in Rust could not have complained that 
they were prevented from using government funds to deliver a message 
the government itself opposed.146 
 There is intuitive appeal to the notion that the government can, 
like anyone else, choose to support some messages and not others. As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said in rejecting a policeman’s claim 
that he was unconstitutionally denied employment because of his po-
litical beliefs, “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk 
                                                                                                                 
143 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137–38; Rust, 500 U.S. at 198; McAuliffe v. Mayor of New 
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892); see also Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Gov-
ernment Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 543, 549 (1986) (addressing the ar-
gum  from the violation of a right). 
 at 549. 
–38. 
00. 
ent that the denial of a subsidy can be distinguished
144 See Redish & Kessler, supra note 143,
145 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137
146 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198–2
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politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”147 The 
government speech doctrine reflects this apparently commonsense 
rule, and, in Helen Norton’s records, “already permits government 
employers to make viewpoint-specific distinctions when punishing on-
duty speech that may disrupt workplace operations—such as speech 
critical of a government employer.”148 Similar thinking has influenced 
the Court’s treatment of the line between government speech and pub-
lic forum analysis. At the oral argument in Summum, for example, the 
justices repeatedly voiced their concern that the government, by ac-
cepting one monument, would have to accept them all.149 The Court 
held that the U.S. government’s acceptance of the Statue of Liberty did 
not compel it to provide “a comparable location in the harbor of New 
York for other statues of a similar size and nature (for example, a Statue 
f A
e when it comes to the viewpoint-based 
eni
                                                                                                                     
o utocracy, if one had been offered by, say, the German Empire or 
Imperial Russia).”150 To avoid that state of affairs, the Court deter-
mined that Pleasant Grove City could effectively make viewpoint-based 
decisions in accepting certain monuments and not others.151 
 But for all of its intuitive appeal, the “subsidized speech” model is 
also deeply unsatisfactory in this context. For one thing, the distinction 
between a punishment and the denial of a subsidy is not always as clear 
as it may appear.152 As David Cole notes: “Every decision to subsidize a 
particular message has the effect of ‘singling out a disfavored group on 
the basis of speech content,’ namely the group that does not receive 
the subsidy because it seeks to express a different message.”153 This ob-
servation rings particularly tru
d al of a government-provided benefit that has traditionally been ac-
corded without reference to viewpoint and upon which private parties 
 
); id. ( Justice Scalia: “You can’t run a museum if you have to accept 
ever
m, 129 S. Ct. at 1137–38. 
0; Post, supra note 17, at 179. 
147 McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518. 
148 Norton, supra note 63, at 62 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)). 
149 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 35 (Chief Justice Roberts: 
“[D]o we have to have a statue of despotism? Do we have to put any president who wants to 
be on Mount Rushmore?”); id. at 29 ( Justice Kennedy: “Does the law always require an all-
or-nothing position?”
ything, right?”). 
150 Summu
151 See id. 
152 See Cole, supra note 17, at 69
153 Cole, supra note 17, at 690. 
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have come to rely.154 Such denials may be the functional equivalent of a 
direct regulation of speech.155 
 Evaluating these intuitions and doctrinal rules in a more rigorous 
fashion requires some understanding of “baselines,” so that one can 
characterize a particular denial as either the withholding of a benefit or 
the imposition of a viewpoint-based punishment. Scholars attempting 
to make sense of the notion of “unconstitutional conditions” have 
struggled with this question,156 and it is not my aim to try to improve 
on their efforts. But it seems relatively uncontroversial to assume that 
e 
would agree that there are some reasons that are insufficient to justify 
even the denial of a “benefit.”160 For example, the government has no 
     
th “baseline” of free speech includes a private right to articulate a 
viewpoint.157 This assumption is in keeping with the ideal of the speech 
market as a place that, like the economic market, is presumptively pri-
vate, even when speech acts take place on public property. Thus, for 
example, “Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to 
the speaker, not the censor.”158 
 In any event, one need not have a fully satisfactory account of un-
constitutional conditions to see that there are also shared intuitions 
that reflect discomfort with the subsidy argument.159 Most citizens 
                                                                                                                 
154 Post, supra note 17, at 179 (invoking the example of inexpensive second-class post-
age); see Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 Yale L.J. 2087, 2097 (1991) 
(arguing that such a denial is “roughly equivalent to that of a criminal prosecution”). 
fining unconstitutional conditions); Richard Ep-
stei utional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 
13–
ights in a Positive State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984). 
157 g the 
“coerc
158
159 , dis-
sentin
 note 143, at 549 
 
155 See Post, supra note 17, at 179. 
156 See Cole, supra note 17, at 679 (de
n, Unconstit
14 (1988). The best account remains Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of 
Negative R
 See Epstein, supra note 156, at 13–14 (discussing possible baselines for assessin
ive effects of government action”). 
 Id. 
 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 613 (1998) (Souter, J.
g). 
We [have] recognized that the government may act on the basis of viewpoint 
when the State is the speaker or when the State disburses public funds to pri-
vate entities to convey a governmental message. But . . . [w]hen the govern-
ment acts as patron, subsidizing the expression of others, it may not prefer 
one lawfully stated view over another. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Schauer, supra note 52, at 96 
(“When government is operating in its subsidizing mode and not in its speaking mode, the 
existing caselaw supports the view that viewpoint-based distinctions are impermissible 
. . . .”). 
160 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969) 
(concluding that the “benefit” of a public education cannot be conditioned on the aban-
donment of First Amendment rights); see also Redish & Kessler, supra
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affirmative duty to provide Medicare. But having done so, it cannot de-
ny Medicare only to African-Americans.161 The same reasoning ap-
lies
should not be read to “sug-
est 
p —with reference to different background principles, of course—in 
the context of free speech. The government has no affirmative obliga-
tion to fund universities, but, having done so, it may not fire professors 
simply because they are critical of government policies.162 
 This intuition, too, has some support in doctrine, dating back to 
Rust, the very first government speech case, in which the Court upheld 
a federal law that denied federal funds to doctors who gave their pa-
tients information about abortion.163 In doing so, the Rust court bent 
over backwards to disclaim any approval of viewpoint discrimination.164 
Indeed, the Court warned that its opinion 
g that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the 
freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Gov-
ernment-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify government 
control over the content of expression.”165 
 Rust is not the only case to indicate that viewpoint-based distinc-
tions are impermissible even when it comes to subsidies. In 1972, in 
Healy v. James, the U.S. Supreme Court held that denying school affilia-
tion to a student group based on that group’s objectionable philoso-
                                                                                                                      
(pointing out that the government may not choose welfare recipients based on race, even 
though no one has a constitutional right to receive welfare payments). 
161 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Redish & Kessler, supra note 143, at 549; see also 
Alex
hich may 
be d
g 
activ
ct stated that regulations within managerial domains would 
not 
e subsidization of speech can never infringe the first amendment, nor that 
the  substantive speech restrictions it chooses on the use 
of it
ander v. Holmes Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (making clear that racial 
discrimination in public services will not be constitutionally tolerated). 
162 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Redish & Kessler, supra note 143, at 549; see also Pickering 
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“The theory that public employment w
enied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, 
has been uniformly rejected.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
163 500 U.S. at 193. Rust was not explicitly premised on the doctrine of government 
speech, but the Court itself has come to treat it that way. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541 
(“The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counselin
ities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpret-
ing the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.”). 
164 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193; see also Cole, supra note 17, at 689 n.47 (concluding that, 
despite the Court’s efforts to “avoid the conclusion that the regulations were viewpoint-
based . . . the Title X regulations were, in fact, aimed at suppressing a particular idea, the 
idea that abortion is a legitimate option for a pregnant woman”); Post, supra note 17, at 
170 (“The Court in Rust in effe
be deemed viewpoint discriminatory so long as they were necessary to accomplish 
legitimate managerial ends.”). 
165 Rust, 503 U.S. at 199; see also Cole, supra note 17, at 693 (“Rust does not in fact hold 
that the selectiv
government is free to impose any
s funds.”). 
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phy—hardly a complete ban on private expression—was unconstitu-
tional because it meant “restrict[ing] speech or association simply be-
cause [the college] finds the views expressed by [the] group to be ab-
horrent.”166 Similarly, in 1981, in Widmar v. Vincent, the Court struck 
down a public university rule that prohibited registered student groups 
from using classrooms for religious teaching or worship.167 The Court 
described this rule as “violat[ing] the fundamental principle that a state 
regulation of speech should be content-neutral . . . .”168 Again in 1995, 
in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the govern-
ment was providing a “benefit” that was not constitutionally man-
dated—funding for student organizations—and yet the Court held that 
e 
other voices.171 The government can distort the marketplace of ideas— 
     
th funds must be allocated on a viewpoint-neutral basis.169 Indeed, 
even the public forum cases support this intuition, for they involve pri-
vate expression on and through government-owned forums. As Robert 
Post notes, Supreme Court doctrine indicates that “when the state at-
tempts to restrict the independent contributions of citizens to public 
discourse, even if those contributions are subsidized, First Amendment 
rules prohibiting content and viewpoint discrimination will apply.”170 
 The general unease with viewpoint-based allocation of so-called 
subsidies thus has both intuitive appeal and doctrinal support. Indeed, 
no matter the angle from which one views them—effects- or purpose-
based, listener- or speaker-focused—subsidies and regulations look a lot 
alike. First Amendment theories that focus mainly on the effect of a gov-
ernment action are unlikely to put much stock in the subsidy/regulation 
distinction because their primary concern with government speech is 
the possibility that it may distort the marketplace of ideas and drown out 
                                                                                                                 
166 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972). 
167 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). 
168 Id.; see Southworth, 539 U.S. at 233 (upholding the university’s decision to subsidize 
some student groups over others, but noting that it could not “prefer some viewpoints to 
others” when distributing funds). 
169 515 U.S. at 834 (“Although acknowledging that the Government is not required to 
subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights . . . we reaffirmed the requirement of view-
point neutrality in the Government’s provision of financial benefits . . . .”). 
65. 
threat than corporate 
 
170 Post, supra note 17, at 155. Post goes on to note, for reasons discussed below, that 
“[t]he general principle forbidding viewpoint discrimination must therefore be false with 
respect to such subsidized speech.” Id. at 1
171 Cole, supra note 17, at 680 (“From the perspective of the audience, the danger lies 
not in the coercive effect of the benefit on speakers, but in the indoctrinating effect of a 
monopolized marketplace of ideas.”). 
In light of the controversy surrounding the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United 
v. FEC, which struck down restrictions on corporate political giving, it may be important to 
remember that “[g]overnment-funded speech poses an even greater 
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drowning out other voices with the power of its own—just as effectively 
through subsidies as through regulations. In fact, when it comes to the 
effects of government speech on would-be speakers, it does not matter 
whether a particular limitation on speech is characterized as a regula-
tion or as the government’s own speech. The latter tends to look like 
nothing more than a justification for the former. Consider again the 
facts of Summum: a group wants to engage in a speech act (building a 
monument) on public property and is told that it cannot.172 From the 
group’s point of view, how is that anything but a “regulation”? As David 
ole
 are directed at, for 
                                                                                                                     
C  explains, “[f]rom the listener’s perspective, the dangers posed by 
selective support of expression differ only in degree, not kind, from the 
dangers posed by selective prohibitions on speech.”173 Thus the subsidy 
distinction is particularly unsatisfying with regard to effects-based First 
Amendment theories, whether those theories are concerned with effects 
on speakers or on listeners.174 
 Just as effects-based tests struggle to draw meaningful lines between 
regulations and subsidies, so too do purpose-based tests and theories 
tend to collapse the distinction. In 1992, in R.A.V., the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that even if a certain category of speech is “unprotected,” 
the government may not draw viewpoint-based distinctions within it.175 
In other words, the government may criminalize all fighting words, but 
it may not criminalize only those fighting words that
example, racial minorities, or Democrats, or Catholics.176 This suggests a 
strong viewpoint neutrality principle, one that prevents the government 
from purposefully discriminating on the basis of viewpoint even when 
dealing with speech that is not protected by the First Amendment. Even 
speech that falls “outside” the bounds of the First Amendment cannot 
be limited on the basis of the viewpoint it expresses. 
 Under the R.A.V. approach, the subsidy/regulation distinction 
seems to disintegrate entirely. The whole purpose of the “subsidy” 
 
speech; its aggregations of wealth dwarf those of corporations, and it has a much more 
imm minate the marketplace of ideas.” Cole, supra note 
17, ed v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
rst of days, attend a criminal prosecu-
tion  artist languishes in prison. From the perspective of the public, 
how
e side of a debate to fight 
free les.”). 
ediate self-interest in seeking to do
at 707. See generally Citizens Unit
172 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. 
173 Cole, supra note 17, at 705. 
174 See Fiss, supra note 154, at 2096 (“A denial of a grant does not have the brutal con-
sequences for the individual that might, on the wo
 for obscenity, when the
ever, its effect is similar: It keeps art from us.”). 
175 505 U.S. at 383–84. 
176 Id. at 391–92 (“St. Paul has no such authority to license on
style, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry ru
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characterization, after all, is to remove certain speech acts from the 
ambit of the First Amendment by recharacterizing them as govern-
ment-supported.177 But as R.A.V. shows, removing speech acts from the 
ac
otect speakers or listeners, or to prevent bad effects or 
purposes, the subsidy/regulation distinction is unsatisfactory. It may be 
nd subsi-
die ertainly are not different enough to justify wildly differ-
nt 
re-
quirement tends to occupy the field. Other scholars treat the two cate-
gories as simply independent.183 In either case, the assumption seems 
re h of the Amendment does not remove them from the viewpoint 
neutrality requirement. Nor is R.A.V. the only case to suggest as much; 
the Court has invoked the neutrality principle even in cases involving 
government “benefits” like funding for student organizations.178 This 
suggests that, in keeping with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
(such as it is),179 viewpoint discrimination cannot be made permissible 
simply by saying that it involves subsidies rather than regulations.180 
 Thus, whether one believes that the free speech guarantee is in-
tended to pr
possible to maintain some distinction between regulations a
s, but they c
e First Amendment treatment. If viewpoint-based distinctions are en-
tirely banned when characterized as regulations, then it makes little 
sense for them to receive no constitutional scrutiny when characterized 
as subsidies. 
2. The Duck-Rabbit of Government Speech and Government 
Regulation 
 Many judges and scholars have dealt with the conflict between the 
viewpoint neutrality requirement and government speech doctrine by, 
in effect, shutting their eyes to it.181 Sometimes government speech is 
referred to as a “glaring exception to the First Amendment norm that 
the government must be viewpoint neutral,”182 thus suggesting that 
government speech is the outlier and that the viewpoint neutrality 
                                                                                                                      
177 See McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518; Norton, supra note 63, at 62. 
178 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267–70. 
179 Generally, the doctrine “maintains that government may not condition benefits on 
the  17, at 679. Whether the doctrine 
has
titutional conditions doctrine is an “anachronism”). 
–70. 
. 
L. R
forfeiture of constitutional rights.” Cole, supra note
 ever been coherent is another matter entirely. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 595–608 
(arguing that the uncons
180 See e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267
181 See infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text. 
182 See The Supreme Court—Leading Cases—G. Freedom of Speech and Expression, 119 Harv
ev. 277, 283 (2005). 
183 See Dolan, supra note 77, at 72; Park, supra note 2, at 129. 
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to  that the two categories can be differentiated. be
189 In the former, the Court 
jec
 (access to the park) to which the Sum-
um
                                                                                                                     
184 But there is good 
reason to believe that this assumption is flawed. Like an optical illusion 
that is two different images at once—a duck and a rabbit, for exam-
ple185—a principled method of distinguishing between government 
speech and viewpoint discrimination seems impossible to articulate. 
 The “subsidy” characterization has been perhaps the most popular 
and effective blinder when it comes to papering over the government 
speech/government regulation problem.186 The Rust Court, for exam-
ple, turned backflips to decide that by denying funding to doctors who 
expressed viewpoints different from the government’s, “the govern-
ment has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely cho-
sen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”187 The failure of 
this subsidy characterization to answer the First Amendment problem is 
captured most clearly in the (by now well-recognized188) inconsistency 
of the Rust and Rosenberger lines of cases.
re ted a First Amendment challenge to the government’s viewpoint-
based exclusion of doctors from a public funding stream.190 In the lat-
ter, it treated public funding as a public forum in which viewpoint-
based discrimination was impermissible.191 Any distinction between the 
two is so subtle as to be unhelpful at best. 
 But one need not contrast different cases to find inconsistencies— 
individual decisions have proven capable of internal incoherence. Sum-
mum provides a useful example of the duck-rabbit illusion. The fact that 
the Summum were denied the right to build a monument in Pleasant 
Grove City’s park could be characterized not as exclusion from a public 
forum but as denial of a benefit
m  were never entitled.192 Access to the park, in other words, was a 
 
184 Norton & Citron, supra note 15, at 929 (“To be sure, determining if the govern-
men oints is sometimes difficult.”). 
it-Duck Illusion, Wolfram MathWorld, http://mathworld. 
wolf
e Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
rguing that the distinction be-
twee herent theoretical premise”); Post, supra note 17, at 170 
(sam
e student 
activ s on a content- and viewpoint-neutral basis); see 
Sout 9 U.S. at 230 (“[T]he viewpoint neutrality requirement of the University 
pro
. 
t is speaking for itself or if it is instead censoring viewp
185 See Eric W. Weisstein, Rabb
ram.com/Rabbit-DuckIllusion.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
186 See infra notes 188−192 and accompanying text. 
187 Se
188 See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 17, at 1382 (a
n the cases rests on “an inco
e). 
189 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S at 828; Rust, 500 U.S. at 178. 
190 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178. 
191 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (holding that public universities must provid
ities fees to student organization
hworth, 52
gram is in general sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting students.”). 
192 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131
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government “benefit” the government was not required to provide.193 
And surely the government is, at the very least, entitled to express its 
own viewpoint when it doles out government benefits. In other words, 
we have a duck. So far, so good. 
 But what happens if one ceases to assume that the government had 
the right to exclude the Summum?194 That, after all, was the issue in the 
case, not the starting point. Surely if the government has a “right” to 
sts on implausible premises—that there 
is a meaningful difference between regulations and subsidies in this 
co t 
as 
ggests another fundamental in-
uir
exclude unwanted speakers, then its doing so might well be expressive, 
but that is just assuming the conclusion. If the government does not 
have that right, then the exclusion of the Summum from the public 
park becomes a regulation rather than a denial of a “benefit.” No facts 
have changed; only the baseline assumption has. And yet the duck has 
become a rabbit. 
 The point is simply that the standard either/or distinction is ulti-
mately unsatisfying. It either re
ntext—or makes impermissible assumptions—that the governmen
h a right to regulate private viewpoints. If government speech doc-
trine and the viewpoint neutrality requirement are to be reconciled, 
theory and doctrine must be able to recognize both their incompatibil-
ity and their interdependence. 
II. The Role of Government Viewpoint in Government Speech 
 Part I illustrates a basic problem: government speech doctrine 
rewards precisely what the rest of the First Amendment forbids— view-
point-based limitations on private speech. And yet government speech 
itself is too valuable to jettison. The government must be able to ex-
press viewpoints, both as ends in themselves and because nearly every 
act of meaningful governance requires the government to do just 
that.195 Recognizing the importance of both government speech and 
the viewpoint neutrality principle su
q y: what is the role of government viewpoint in government speech 
cases? After all, as we have seen, free speech doctrine is deeply con-
cerned with the protection of private viewpoints. It seems to follow that 
government speech doctrine should be concerned with protecting gov-
                                                                                                                      
193 See id. 
194 I explore this question in detail elsewhere. See generally Blocher, Government Property 
and Government Speech, supra note 16. 
195 See Yudof, supra note 24, at 6−10; Cole, supra note 17, at 703−04. 
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ernme f gov-
rnm
But there can be no doubt that nearly all laws banning speech—indeed, 
law
nt viewpoint. And yet the role—or even the existence—o
e ent viewpoints remains obscure. 
 Exploring the role of government viewpoint in government speech 
cases leads to at least three different questions: What does it mean for 
the government to have a viewpoint? Is it possible for the government to 
have a viewpoint? Does current government speech doctrine require the 
government to demonstrate a viewpoint? This Part attempts to answer 
those questions and to suggest a possible resolution of the relationship 
etwb een government viewpoint and government speech. 
A. What Does It Mean for the Government to Have a Viewpoint? 
 The first question is easily framed, but deceptively hard to answer: 
What does it mean for the government to have a viewpoint, and is the 
government’s expression of a viewpoint enough to demonstrate gov-
ernment speech? Scholars have struggled to define “viewpoint” and 
“viewpoint neutrality” in the course of analyzing government regula-
tions of private speech.196 The inquiry, it turns out, is if anything more 
difficult in the context of government speech. 
 On the one hand, it seems self evident that any government regula-
tion that purposefully discriminates against private viewpoints is itself an 
expression of viewpoint. That is, if the government passes a regulation 
criminalizing a particular viewpoint because the government disagrees 
with it (and not, say, because of its harmful side effects), it follows natu-
rally that by doing so the government has expressed its disagreement 
with that viewpoint. The Supreme Court has not devised a test by which 
to determine whether a particular government action is expressive.197 
s banning any kind of conduct—are expressive enough to satisfy any 
                                                                                                                      
196 See Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an In-
creasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 69, 104 (1997) (“The supposedly rigid 
and formulaic jurisprudence that centers around the deceptively clear categories of con-
tent-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based laws is . . . increasingly malleable and 
amorphous.”); Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget 
Malleable Doctrine, 13 Comm. L. & Pol’y 131, 132–34 (2008) (arguing that the Court has 
used various definitions of the terms “viewpoint,” “content,” and “perspective” to yield 
inconsistent results); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and The First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 
589, 615 (suggesting that “the distinction between content-based and viewpoint-based re-
strictions is at best elusive and more likely nonexistent” and that the “distinction itself will 
depend on viewpoint”); see also Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 Colum. L. 
Rev
osition . . . .”). 
 Government Speech, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 365, 369–71 (2009) 
(dis h). 
. 697, 698 (1996) (defining viewpoint discrimination simply as “allowing speech that 
adopts one point of view while prohibiting speech that takes a contrary p
197 See Andy G. Olree, Identifying
cussing the lack of a uniform test for identifying government speec
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of the various tests the Court has devised for determining whether pri-
vate actions qualify as expression under the First Amendment. In its 
1974 decision in Spence v. Washington,198 for example, the Court held 
that nonverbal conduct will be considered “communicative” enough to 
fall within the First Amendment where “[a]n intent to convey a particu-
riz
, after 
l, i
ar government viewpoint (or animos-
ity towards any particular private viewpoint), or it can be viewpoint neu-
tral because it does not have the effect of muzzling private viewpoints. 
Say
la ed message was present, and . . . [where] the likelihood was great 
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”199 
Nearly any imaginable regulation banning a private party from speaking 
in a particular forum would probably satisfy this standard, even if it was 
not accompanied by a specific statement of reasons. And if that is 
enough to characterize the regulation as “expressive” government 
speech—and therefore render it exempt from the First Amendment—
then the Amendment’s protections are vanishingly small indeed. 
 But surely it cannot be that only unexpressive or purposeless laws 
are subject to constitutional scrutiny. First Amendment doctrine
al s constructed around the premise that speech regulations can be 
viewpoint neutral.200 To be a valid time, place, and manner restriction, 
for example, a law must be viewpoint- and content-neutral, in addition 
to leaving adequate alternative avenues for expression.201 Some laws 
clearly meet this test.202 Were it otherwise, the viewpoint neutrality re-
quirement would swallow every speech-limiting rule. Perhaps it is pos-
sible to back into a definition of viewpoints by examining what it means 
to discriminate against them—by exploring viewpoint neutrality. 
 There are at least two ways to be viewpoint “neutral”: in purpose 
and in effect. That is, a law can be viewpoint neutral because its passage 
was not motivated by any particul
 a city passes an ordinance prohibiting speeches on a particular cor-
ner that, it turns out, is generally used by anti-abortion protestors. 
                                                                                                                      
198 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
199 Id. at 410–11; see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
ts 
mes
 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
signated sites against a challenge by demonstrators staging a political event). 
200 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790−803 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293−99 (1984); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“Government action that stifles speech on account of i
sage, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Govern-
ment, contravenes [an] essential right.”); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1988) 
(holding that the statute was viewpoint neutral but still content based). 
201 Ward, 491
202 See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 790−803 (upholding a municipal sound amplification 
guideline); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293−99 (upholding a National Park Service regulation limiting 
camping to de
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T re are many ways to ask whether the action is viewpoint neutral: Is 
the government seeking to squelch the anti-abortion viewpoints?
he
                                                                              
203 Or, 
even if it is not so motivated, will the regulation have the effect of limit-
ing anti-abortion viewpoints?204 
 Some Supreme Court justices have focused on effect, arguing, for 
example, that a content-based restriction should be unconstitutional 
“regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.”205 But that approach 
has not prevailed. Instead, in current First Amendment doctrine, the 
primary concern with regard to viewpoints is whether the government 
has an improper purpose, not whether its “neutral” regulations have the 
effect of limiting some viewpoints more than others.206 For example, the 
Court has held that “[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to 
the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental 
effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”207 That approach 
suggests that First Amendment doctrine is, and should be, properly 
concerned (even if not explicitly so208) with smoking out invidious gov-
ernment purpose.209 In his concurring opinion in 2010, in Christian Le-
gal Society v. Martinez,210 Justice Kennedy noted that “the school policy in 
question is not content based either in its formulation or evident pur-
                                        
203 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1993) (upholding an 
injunction preventing protests at an abortion clinic because the order did not aim to elim-
inate anti-abortion viewpoints, but rather aimed to limit interference with the clinic’s law-
ful o
inez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 
2996
ttled principles the purpose of Congress . . . is not a basis for declaring this legis-
latio
); Madsen, 512 
U.S
dy, J., concurring). 
perations). 
204 See id. at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the injunction, whether or not it 
targeted speech-based content, nevertheless had the effect of suppressing anti-abortion 
viewpoints). 
205 Boos, 485 U.S. at 336 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.). 
206 See Kagan, supra note 27, at 414; Rubenfeld, supra note 57, at 798 (“If the purpose 
behind a law is to punish people for engaging in protected speech, the state is acting un-
constitutionally.” (emphasis omitted)). 
207 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; accord Christian Legal Soc’y v. Mart
–97 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is a basic tenet of First Amendment law 
that disparate impact does not, in itself, constitute viewpoint discrimination.”); Madsen, 
512 U.S. at 763 (“[T]he fact that the injunction covered people with a particular viewpoint 
does not itself render the injunction content or viewpoint based.”). 
208 The Court in the 1968 case of United States v. O’Brien, for example, declared that 
“under se
n unconstitutional,” despite the fact that, as Jed Rubenfeld notes, “the O’Brien test 
itself is centrally concerned with legislative purpose, despite the Court’s protests to the 
contrary.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); Rubenfeld, supra note 57, at 
775–76. 
209 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2996–97 (Stevens, J., concurring
. at 763; Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see also Kagan, supra note 27, at 414 (“[T]he application 
of First Amendment law is best understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-
shunting.”). 
210 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2998 (Kenne
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po ; and were it shown to be otherwise, the case likely should have a 
different outcome.”211 Thus, the effects of a government regulation are 
relevant insofar as they lead to the real goal—the identification of im-
proper government motivation, which in turn means punishing some-
body for “speaking.”212 
 If viewpoint neutrality means lacking certain purposes, then per-
haps the converse is true, and having these purposes is equivalent to 
having a viewpoint. But clearly the two categories cannot entirely over-
lap. If only purposeless laws are viewpoint neutral, then the reach of 
government viewpoint and therefore the problem of government 
speech is far larger than anyone has imagined. Moreover, it seems clear 
that the government can pass a law that does not intentionally express a 
viewpoint, even if it does have a purpose. For example, if Congress 
passes a law limiting anti-abortion speech, it su
se
rely intends to do just 
atth . In other words, it has a “purpose.” But that does not necessarily 
mean that it has—or at least is expressing—a viewpoint. It may seek to 
limit such speech simply because it has concluded that the abortion 
debate is counterproductive and harmful, and should be silenced for a 
few years to give each side a cooling off period. 
 What this shows is that there may be a distinction between a law’s 
“purpose” —the reason for its existence—and its “viewpoint.”213 So 
what kinds of purposes demonstrate a viewpoint? The analysis above 
has effectively brought us back to our initial question: What does it 
mean for a regulation to be viewpoint based? As Robert Post puts it, “In 
ordinary language, we would say that . . . a viewpoint-based regulation is 
one that intervenes into a specific controversy in order to advantage or 
disadvantage a particular perspective or position within that contro-
versy.”214 Taking the terms of this definition and bending them slightly, 
                                                                                                                      
211 Id. at 2999; see also id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court ignores strong ev-
idence that the accept-all-comers policy is not viewpoint neutral because it was announced 
as a pretext to justify viewpoint discrimination.”). 
212 See 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
213 Although this Article attempts to draw a line between viewpoint and purpose, I fol-
low the lead of those before me and do not attempt to draw any distinctions between 
“purpose,” “intent,” “motive,” “reason,” and so on. See Kagan, supra note 27, at 426 n.40 
(disclaiming any effort to distinguish between such terms, and noting that “[t]he Court 
has used these terms interchangeably, in First Amendment jurisprudence and elsewhere”); 
see also John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale 
L.J. 1205, 1217–21 (1970) (criticizing attempts to draw such lines); Post, supra note 117, at 
1268 (“There is a pervasive ambiguity as to whether courts are to assess the justification for 
a regulation (the reasons that can be adduced for its passage) or the motivation for a regu-
lation (the actual psychological intentions of those who enacted it).”). 
214 Post, supra note 17, at 166. 
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one might say that a viewpoint is a particular perspective or position 
within a specific controversy. A government viewpoint, therefore, is the 
government’s perspective or position within a specific controversy. Of 
course, this presumes that “perspective” and “controversy” can usefully 
be defined. But at the very least, this definition suggests that govern-
en
 anything but satisfactory. At best, it simply means 
that the government must “actually” have some kind of motivation be-
sid -
by disclaiming its own ability to divine legislative intent.217 For example, 
in 1
m t viewpoints are those that the government holds independently of 
any private speakers. In other words, to qualify as government speech, 
the government’s viewpoint may not simply be, “We disagree with Pri-
vate Speaker A.” As a practical and doctrinal matter, this would mean 
focusing attention again on whether the reasons for a regulation are 
pretextual, and whether the government could show that it held a par-
ticular position before (or independently of) its efforts to silence a par-
ticular private speaker expressing a contrary one.215 
 This definition is
es limiting a private viewpoint. At worst, it is empty—another duck
rabbit.216 Nevertheless, if protecting private viewpoints is the central 
concern of the First Amendment, and government speech doctrine is 
entitled to “protection” under the Amendment, then it would seem to 
follow that government must be able to have viewpoints, and that we 
must be able to identify them. The following Section addresses the 
identification issue. 
B. Is It Possible for the Government to Have or Demonstrate a Viewpoint? 
 The previous Section demonstrated that government viewpoint is 
difficult to define. The purpose of this Section is to show that even if it 
can be defined, it may not be possible to identify—indeed, it may not 
be possible for it to exist. 
 The Supreme Court has suggested its awareness of these problems 
968, in United States v. O’Brien, the Court stated that “[i]nquiries into 
                                                                                                                      
215 Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 687 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he organization must at least show it has adopted and advocated an unequivocal 
posi tomized by the person whom the 
orga
is possible to dis-
cern of a statute . . . , discerning the subjective motivation of those 
enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.”). 
tion inconsistent with a position advocated or epi
nization seeks to exclude.”). 
216 See supra notes 181−194 and accompanying text. 
217 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is virtually impossi-
ble to determine the singular ‘motive’ of a collective legislative body . . . .”); Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile it 
 the objective purpose 
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congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter,”218 and that 
“this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on 
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”219 Whether this state-
ment can or should be taken at face value is somewhat unclear. As not-
lena Kagan and others have argued that First 
on the issue and intends 
her vote to be evidence of that viewpoint, how are those votes to be ag-
gre
ed above, then-professor E
Amendment doctrine is in fact primarily concerned with rooting out 
improper government purpose.220 At the very least, however, the 
Court’s disclaimer in O’Brien properly highlights the theoretical and 
practical difficulties of the government viewpoint-based approach.221 
1. Theoretical Problems 
 Despite constitutional law’s occasional searches for government 
motive,222 there are strong arguments that such inquiries are doomed, 
and that there is no such thing as a coherent purpose or “viewpoint” 
behind any given government action. 
 One strong version of the argument is that it is impossible to iden-
tify the purpose (let alone viewpoint) of a legislative body made up of 
legislators whose purposes—assuming that they are coherent to begin 
with—cannot be assembled together into a meaningful picture.223 It is 
difficult enough to identify a particular “purpose” behind an individual 
legislator’s vote.224 A representative might vote in favor of a speech-
restricting bill not because she disagrees with or disapproves of the 
speech it restricts, but solely because by doing so she can win support 
for reelection or for another piece of legislation that matters more to 
her. What is the “purpose” or “viewpoint” represented by such a vote? 
And even assuming that our representative—and every single one of 
her colleagues—truly does have a viewpoint 
gated in any meaningful way? The 218 members of a 435-member 
                                                                                                                      
218 391 U.S. at 383–84. 
219 Id. at 383. 
220 See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 
Sta  actually shows that “some motives are 
unc
n L. Rev. 585, 590 (1975) (arguing that O’Brien
onstitutional”); Post, supra note 117, at 1256 (“[A] close analysis of these cases indi-
cates that they almost invariably turn on judicial scrutiny of the purposes served by the 
regulation at issue.”). 
221 See 391 U.S. at 383–84. 
222 See Bhagwat, supra note 57, at 312−19. 
223 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 213–21 (2d ed. 
1986); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 38–57 (1985). But see infra notes 249–
261 and accompanying text. 
224 See Dworkin, supra note 223, at 38. 
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le ature needed to pass a bill will never have identical viewpoints on 
any given issue.
gisl
 is unclear whether the very 
sti
                         
225 And, even if one could somehow measure legislators’ 
viewpoints, it is dubious whether these viewpoints could ever amount to 
a singular and cohesive “legislative intent.”226 
 One answer to these theoretical difficulties might be to say that the 
intent of the individual legislators is irrelevant, because such intent 
does not exist, or at least not in any useful way.227 Instead, perhaps what 
matters is the viewpoint a law will be understood to communicate by 
those who hear or see it.228 And yet there is reason to doubt that this 
approach works in the context of government speech. First, it would 
involve an odd pairing of purposivist and listener-focused approaches 
to speech. The focus on “understanding” in constitutional originalism, 
after all, has proven popular precisely because it lessens the fruitless 
search for “intent.”229 Second, if we abandon the speaker-centered ap-
proach and focus purely on the audience, it
ju fication for government speech survives. That is, it seems odd to 
construct doctrine allowing the government to defend a “viewpoint” it 
might not even hold, and which is defined solely by what the public 
believes the government’s viewpoint to be. 
                                                                                             
225 Bickel, supra note 223, at 214−215; Dworkin, supra note 223, at 38. 
226 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 
m violates one or more “fairness” conditions); Frank H. 
East ev. 533, 537–39 (1983); Kenneth A. Shepsle, 
Congre . 239, 
249–5
227
tions of 
the actual, “subjective” intentions of the legislators. The purpose that judges are 
f the framers.”); 
Keit
focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of consti-
tutio as adopted.”). 
328, 342–43 (1950) (describing mathematically—and much more elaborately—that there 
is no voting system that can result in optimum social preference when there are three or 
more choices, unless the syste
erbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. R
ss Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ
0 (1992). 
 Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 57, at 796. 
Ultimately, . . . judicial determinations of legislative purpose must be recognized 
for what they often are—legal constructions, as opposed to determina
looking for is the purpose that constitutional law should regard as the legisla-
tion’s purpose—the purpose that should be imputed to the legislation. 
Id. 
228 A similar move has proven fruitful for constitutional originalists. See Jamal Greene, 
On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2009) (explaining the differences be-
tween “original meaning” and “original intent”). 
229 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 620 
(1999) (“[O]riginalism has itself changed—from original intention to original meaning. No 
longer do originalists claim to be seeking then subjective intentions o
h E. Wittington, The New Originalism, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 599, 609 (2004) (“[T]he 
new originalism is 
nal text than on the public meaning of the text that w
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 Thus, it is problematic enough to try to define the government’s 
viewpoint or purpose when one focuses solely on the government’s at-
tempts to craft a coherent message of its own. And increasingly, gov-
ernment speech claims arise in cases that involve both public and pri-
vate actors.230 In 2009, in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, Justice 
Breyer wondered aloud, “Why can’t we call this what it is—it’s a mixture 
of private speech with Government decisionmaking.”231 
 The issue of specialty license plates provides perhaps the clearest 
and most high-profile example. As many scholars and commentators 
ave
 private actors. 
the Commandments as a religious matter. The town that accepts the 
mo
                                      
h  noted, specialty license plates raise difficult issues of government 
speech because they involve both the state government, which issues 
the plates and whose name appears on them, and private actors, who 
either propose a new specialty plate or wish to purchase the plates and 
display them on their cars.232 To deal with these scenarios, scholars and 
judges have increasingly expressed a wish (or at least willingness) to 
recognize the existence of “mixed” public-private speech.233 
 The recognition of hybrid speech has much to recommend it, as 
the mixture of public and private speech is an unavoidable reality that 
doctrinal rules poorly obscure.234 And yet if hybrid speech were to be 
recognized, it would further complicate the search for a meaningful 
government “viewpoint.” Assuming that viewpoints can be identified, 
then as long as the government and a private party express the same 
one, it might be possible to identify what that viewpoint is. On the oth-
er hand, the problem of a coherent “group” viewpoint, discussed above 
in the context of multi-member legislatures,235 would seem to be even 
more difficult when the group includes both public and
A private group that donates a Ten Commandments monument to a 
public park, for example, almost surely intends to convey its support for 
nument, however, must (in order to comply with the Establishment 
                                                                                
erate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 
305  J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“I 
hav ture . . . .”); id. at 252 (Gregory, J., 
diss
230 See Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 
21, at 1291–1302. 
231 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 24. 
232 See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357, 
1378–81 (2001); Norton & Citron, supra note 15, at 917–19. 
233 See Sons of Confed
F.3d 241, 247 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,
e stated herein that the speech at issue is hybrid in na
enting from denial of rehearing en banc) (lamenting the failure to recognize the 
“blurry and sometimes overlapping line between private and government speech”); Cor-
bin, supra note 91, at 607. 
234 See Corbin, supra note 91, at 607. 
235 See supra notes 225–226 and accompanying text. 
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Clause) be able to say with a relatively straight face that it has some oth-
er purpose in accepting and displaying the monument—expressing 
respect for the area’s historical heritage, for example.236 
 Of course, many of these theoretical problems are not limited to 
rnment viewpoint in government speech cas-
. T
                                                                                                                     
the identification of gove
es hey arise—at the Court’s insistence—in equal protection and oth-
er cases.237 And yet they remain problematic, particularly in the context 
of government speech. 
2. Evidentiary Problems 
 Even assuming that the government can have a viewpoint in the-
ory, it is not clear whether it can ever be identified as a matter of prac-
tice. Searching for government viewpoint using the usual tools of statu-
tory interpretation may be equivalent to searching for water with a 
divining stick—the quarry exists, but the tool will not locate it. 
 Evidence of intent behind a statute may consist “of what fewer than 
a handful of Congressmen said about it,”238 and, of course, “[w]hat mo-
tivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily 
what motivates scores of others to enact it.”239 Where even this scant evi-
dence is lacking, as is often the case, one must attempt to divine legisla-
tive intent based on the act itself.240 Consider again Pleasant Grove 
City’s rejection of the Summum monument.241 Summum argued that if 
the city wanted to claim the rejection as “speech,” then at the very least 
it should pass an ordinance or put up a plaque formally adopting the 
other monuments and thus presumably explicitly express some view-
 
236 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (holding that the Ten Com-
mandments monument had borne historical significance apart from its religious message, 
and
2 (1997) 
(“[W  the government acted with the purpose of advancing or 
inhi igion . . . .”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (reaffirming the 
nec n of the Equal Protection Clause). 
el, supra note 223, at 214−15. 
30. 
 therefore did not violate the Establishment Clause); see also Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 
1138 (upholding a city’s refusal—on the basis of lack of historical or community connec-
tion to the city—to accept an additional private religious-themed monument). 
237 Whereas “[l]ittle more than a quarter century ago, the Supreme Court could claim 
with some plausibility that the government’s actual purposes in enacting legislation were 
constitutionally irrelevant,” today “numerous constitutional doctrines explicitly inquire 
whether the government has acted for forbidden reasons.” Fallon, supra note 53, at 90–91. 
See generally Bhagwat, supra note 57, at 316. The focus on purpose is of course particularly 
prevalent in equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 22
]e continue to ask whether
biting rel
essity of discriminatory purpose for violatio
238 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384. 
239 Id. 
240 See Bick
241 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–
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point that would be tarnished by the inclusion of the Summum monu-
ment.242 The Court refused to impose this requirement on the city, say-
g 
ey involve ques-
tions about the constitutional good faith of government officials.”247 
speech cases, courts may claim agnosticism about 
e 
ct, and that the search for a government viewpoint is as 
in it “fundamentally misunderstands the way monuments convey 
meaning.”243 Similarly, in 2005, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the government must “claim” every word 
of a message for it to count as government speech.244 And yet the Court 
also held that the government need not identify itself as the speaker.245 
 As a result, government speech doctrine itself precludes the kind 
of evidence one would need to even have a chance at identifying the 
government’s viewpoint. There may be an underlying reason for this— 
courts generally try to avoid asking whether the government’s asserted 
reasons for an action are pretextual.246 Indeed, one of the concerns 
with purpose analyses in constitutional law is that “the requisite inquir-
ies may be embarrassing for a court to make, because th
Thus, in government 
th government’s “true” viewpoint because they do not want to put 
themselves in the uncomfortable position of disagreeing with the gov-
ernment’s assertion of what that actual viewpoint is.248 
3. Possible Solutions 
 Assume for a moment that these theoretical and practical objec-
tions are corre
doomed as the search for the “message” behind a statute. What would 
that prove? On the one hand, it would certainly make things more dif-
ficult for purposivist analysis—if the government cannot rightly be said 
                                                                                                                      
242 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 42 (Pamela Harris, attorney for 
respondent). 
243 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1135. 
244 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (“When . . . the government sets the overall message to be 
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it is not precluded from 
relying on the government-speech doctrine . . . .”). 
245 Id. at 564 n.7 (chastising the dissent for citing “no prior practice, no precedent, and 
no authority” for a requirement that the government identify itself when speaking). 
246 See Fallon, supra note 53, at 72. 
247 Id.; accord Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1285 (1986) (“[T]he Justices no doubt 
feel some disinclination to accuse state officials of improper purposes . . . .”). 
248 See Fallon, supra note 53, at 72; Regan, supra note 247, at 1285; cf. Sutliffe v. Town of 
Epping, 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (expressing concern 
that a finding of government speech would “permit[] a governmental entity to engage in 
viewpoint discrimination in its own governmentally-owned channels so long as the gov-
ernmental entity can cast its actions as its own speech after the fact”). 
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to have a purpose, then creating doctrine to search for it is, at best, a 
waste of time. 
 On the other hand, despite their strength, these objections and 
nc
vists continue to ply 
their nd 
free te 
colle
 nt” 
usin she 
answ
tions 
urpose without actually 
stones of First Amendment doctrine. Examining their structure reveals 
that the search for impermissible motive animates the doctrine, as the 
doctrine implements the search for motive.”252 
 
co erns are not necessarily insurmountable and it may be possible to 
identify some kind of government viewpoint sufficient to justify (and 
identify) government speech. After all, purposi
 trade in other realms of statutory and constitutional law,249 a
speech doctrine itself sometimes ascribes a “viewpoint” to priva
ctives like corporations and other organizations.250 
So might it also be possible to identify a government “viewpoi
g a similar approach? Kagan’s statement of the question (which 
ers affirmatively) is worth quoting at length: 
Let us accept that the First Amendment prohibits restric
on speech stemming, even in part, from hostility, sympathy or 
self-interest. And let us accept that the difficulty of proving 
this impermissible motive—resulting, most notably, from the 
government’s ability to provide pretextual reasons—gives rise 
to a set of rules able to flush out bad motives without directly 
asking about them. What would these rules look like?251 
 To oversimplify only slightly, Kagan’s answer is that such rules 
would be constructed to smoke out invidious p
asking directly about it, and that in fact this is precisely the structure of 
current First Amendment doctrine: “These rules—the rules that would 
be devised to flush out illicit purpose—in fact constitute the foundation 
The question of identifying motive is not unique to First Amend-
ment cases, nor are the tools with which courts seek to answer it.253 Jus-
                                                                                                                      
249 See Rubenfeld, supra note 57, at 793–97 (noting that “governmental purposes are 
difficult to ascertain,” but arguing that “the mysteriousness of legislative purpose is over-
rate
se lead to “a reasonably consistent account in most 
case
ens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (corporation); Dale, 530 U.S. 
at 6
egislative history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, and 
 
d”); see also Bhagwat, supra note 57, at 323 (arguing that “the process of attributing 
purposes to the actions of lawmaking bodies is implicit in the legal method” and that at-
tempts to identify government purpo
s”). 
250 See Citiz
44 (organization); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 
557, 559 (1995) (organization). 
251 Kagan, supra note 27, at 443. 
252 Id. 
253 See Rubenfeld, supra note 57, at 794 (“Relevant evidence will include the law’s lan-
guage, its effects, its l
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tice O’Connor has described the primary function of strict scrutiny 
analysis as “smoking out” improper governmental purposes.254 Ashutosh 
Bhagwat argues that “it is not particularly difficult to make reasonable 
judgments about the motivations behind legislation in most cases. Statu-
tory text and structure, legislative history, and an examination of politi-
cal context provide strong and generally adequate tools with which to 
make these determinations.”255 Indeed, he goes further to say that 
“[t]he relative expertise and constitutional role of the Court make it 
better suited to purpose scrutiny than to the means scrutiny that has 
omd inated constitutional analysis since the New Deal.”256 
 Others have suggested that the answer lies in drawing a distinction 
between the “objective” and “subjective” purposes of a statute.257 Justice 
Scalia, for example, has argued that “while it is possible to discern the 
objective purpose of a statute . . ., discerning the subjective motivation 
of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossi-
ble task.”258 By “objective purpose,” Justice Scalia means the purpose 
that is supposedly evident from the text of the statute itself.259 By rely-
ing on the enacted words themselves, a committed textualist can un-
cover a “purpose” that reflexively helps reveal the meaning of the 
words.260 Where such words are available—that is, where a speech regu-
                                                                                                                      
common knowledge.”); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) (identifying factors such as impact, historical background, 
and legislative history to determine whether there was a discriminatory intent in the equal 
protection context). 
254 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring). 
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by 
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen 
“fit” this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the 
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype. 
Id. 
255 Bhagwat, supra note 57, at 322. 
256 Id. at 368. 
257 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Edwards, 
482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
258 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
259 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
260 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 355 (2005). For more on 
the textualist-purposivist debate, which is far beyond the scope of this Article, see generally 
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70 (2006); 
Nelson, supra. 
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lation is enacted as a statute or ordinance that contains sufficient words 
to run through the textualist mill—this approach may prove fruitful. 
 Thus it appears that the search for government viewpoint, though 
plagued with problems, may not be doomed to inevitable failure. As-
suming that this is so, how well does it account for the current state of 
go st 
Amendment doctrine i ion designed to reveal 
ove
implicating government speech end up in different constitutional box-
es. For example, in the 2000 case of Cuffley v. Mickes, decided by the 
                                                                                                                     
vernment speech doctrine? Kagan and others have argued that Fir
s an elaborate construct
g rnmental purposes.261 Does government speech doctrine do as 
much for government viewpoints? 
C. Does Government Speech Doctrine Currently Require the Government to 
Demonstrate a Viewpoint? 
 The previous Sections demonstrate why the search for government 
viewpoint is likely to be frustrating and difficult, if not outright impos-
sible. It may be somewhat unsurprising, then, that contemporary gov-
ernment speech doctrine often does not require the government to 
articulate its viewpoint.262 
 Present government speech doctrine is generally agnostic as to the 
government’s viewpoint. Effectively, the government need only assert 
that it has a message; it need not show what that message is. As Steven 
Gey notes, “The larger problem with the Court’s theory of government 
speech, however, is that in many cases in which the Court has imple-
mented its theory of government speech the government is not really 
saying anything.”263 As the government is not even required to identify 
itself as the party delivering a message,264 it follows naturally that its 
viewpoint need not be identified, either. Perhaps as a result, many cases 
 
261 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 27, at 414 (advocating a purposivist approach to the First 
Amendment); Rubenfeld, supra note 57, at 768 (same). 
262 See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134–37 (holding that the city need not articulate 
the message expressed through the public park and suggesting that it may even change 
over time); see also Gey, supra note 28, at 1269. 
In each of the six manifestations of government speech that the Court has re-
cently addressed, the government either has nothing to say, wants to say 
something that it is not allowed to say, wants to say something that no con-
ceivable conception of a domestic political process would allow it to say, or 
speaks in such a garbled manner that no one can determine what it is saying. 
Gey, supra note 28, at 1269 (internal citations omitted). 
263 Gey, supra note 28, at 1262–63. 
264 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564 n.7 (2005) (suggesting that 
the government need not identify itself when speaking). 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Missouri did not use gov-
ernment speech as a defense to its decision to reject the Ku Klux Klan’s 
application to participate in the state’s Adopt-A-Highway program, 
hic
escriptive matter, the First 
     
w h would have led to a sign noting the Klan’s participation.265 In-
stead, the state’s decision was evaluated under the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.266 
 Perhaps courts avoid inquiring into the government’s specific mo-
tivations because they realize the futility of doing so. As explained in 
Section B, it may be impossible, as a theoretical or practical matter, to 
define government “viewpoint.”267 And if it is true that government 
speech doctrine does not require—and does not even encourage—the 
government to reveal its viewpoint, then it seems to be an exception to 
Kagan’s general argument that “the application of First Amendment 
law is best understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-
hunting.”268 But Kagan’s point is that, as a d
Amendment is actually about a search for improper government mo-
tive, despite its own protestations to the contrary.269 Is it possible that 
government speech is similarly constructed? 
 Certainly, the fact that government speech doctrine does not ex-
plicitly require the government to articulate viewpoints cannot be con-
clusive proof that the doctrine is not designed to identify them. It may 
simply be implicit that when, for example, the government excludes an 
unwanted private speaker from government property, the government 
is expressing disapproval of that speaker.270 After all, the notion that 
exclusion conveys, protects, or is a message is plainly correct and is not 
unique to government speech doctrine.271 The closest analogues may 
be expressive association cases like the 2000 U.S. Supreme Court case 
                                                                                                                 
265 See 208 F.3d 702, 711 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he State admitted repeatedly in deposi-
tions that it does not view the erection of an Adopt-A-Highway sign as an endorsement or 
pro adopter.”). 
companying text. 
overn-
men
exclu-
sion r, Government Property and Government Speech, supra note 16. 
motion of the 
266 Id. at 709. 
267 See supra notes 217–261 and ac
268 Kagan, supra note 27, at 414. 
269 See id. at 427 (discussing what constitutes an impermissible government motive). 
270 This assumption is implicit in First Amendment analysis. See R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment generally prevents g
t from proscribing speech . . . because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”). 
271 See Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2994 (holding that a university antidiscrimina-
tion policy was viewpoint neutral where the school’s Christian Legal Society sought to ex-
clude certain members in order to convey its religious message); Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 
(holding that the right to freedom of association allowed the Boy Scouts to exclude homo-
sexual members). For a more extensive attempt to deal with the expressiveness of 
, see generally Bloche
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Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, which upheld the Boy Scouts’ decision to 
refuse membership to a gay scoutmaster.272 In Dale, the Court con-
cluded that the Boy Scouts’ being forced to retain the scoutmaster 
would send the message “that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual con-
duct as a legitimate form of behavior.”273 And just as government need 
not articulate a viewpoint when excluding others, it is unclear whether 
the Dale rule actually requires the excluding organization to identify 
the viewpoint that is being threatened.274 In dissent, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that “the organization must at least show it has adopted and advo-
cated an unequivocal position inconsistent with a position advocated or 
epitomized by the person whom the organization seeks to exclude.”275 
But the majority deferred to the Boy Scouts’ assertion that they had a 
message, and that the message would be threatened if the organization 
was forced to admit openly gay scoutmasters: “As we give deference to 
an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we 
us
may not always defeat the government’s ability to establish an expres-
sive threat,” because the government may have made a conscious deci-
m t also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair 
its expression.”276 The same deference seems to apply implicitly in gov-
ernment speech cases with respect to viewpoint and exclusion.277 
 A related and difficult question involves the government’s interest 
in avoiding the expression of a viewpoint, whereby the government 
“speaks” not by communicating any particular affirmative viewpoint, 
but by declining to speak at all. To avoid having a private message mis-
takenly attributed to it, the government may sometimes need to silence 
private speakers. Along these lines, Helen Norton argues that “[t]he 
absence of a transparent viewpoint that government seeks to protect 
                                                                                                                      
272 530 U.S. at 640. 
273 Id. at 653. 
274 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134–37 (holding that no articulated viewpoint is neces-
sary
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Norton, supra note 63, at 60 
(“Th
 for which it can thus be held politically accountable.”). 
 when asserting a government speech defense); Dale, 530 U.S. at 651 (“We need not 
inquire further to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to ho-
mosexuality.”); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (asserting deference to an association’s expres-
sion of viewpoints). 
275 Dale, 530 U.S. at 687 
e off-duty speech of a ‘quintessentially public servant’ is most likely to pose a substan-
tial threat to government’s own expressive interests when it clashes with a message that 
government has articulated and
276 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
277 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134–37 (holding that though no specific viewpoint need 
be identified with respect to the public park, the city rightfully excluded the monument in 
furtherance of this viewpoint). 
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sion to remain silent or to reserve judgment on a public debate.278 
That, after all, was the central argument in Summum.279 In other words, 
the government may make an argument akin to that raised by private 
individuals in the 1943 and 1977 Supreme Court cases of West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard—that it has a “right” 
ot 
                                                                                                                     
n to be “compelled” to speak.280 
 This compelled speech argument has become perhaps most nota-
ble in the context of government speech claims involving public em-
ployees.281 In those cases (which are generally not grouped with tradi-
tional government speech cases, but are certainly part of the same 
genre), courts have increasingly rejected public employees’ free speech 
claims not because their speech interferes with their workplace, but 
because the government should be permitted to “exercise . . . employer 
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”282 
In 2006, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, a five-justice majority of the Supreme 
Court held that the government could punish an assistant district at-
torney who wrote a memorandum informing his superiors of appar-
ently fraudulent statements used to support a search warrant in a pend-
ing criminal case.283 The principle behind that decision appears to be 
that public employees’ speech made “pursuant to their official duties” 
 
278 Norton, supra note 63, at 63; see also Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 249 
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The State . . . has not taken a 
position on this controversial symbol; rather it has removed itself from the fray, simply 
refusi
rplay 
federate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 252 (Gregory, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en b
, 139 S. Ct. at 1134–37 (silencing the Summum religion to achieve gov-
ern
; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 
generally Norton, supra note 63 (dis-
cuss
vernment’s claim to control the speech of its workers to protect its own ex-
pre
 421–22. 
ng to authorize the Confederate Flag logo on license plates issued by it.”). 
I would have hoped . . . that we would consider the government’s interest in 
avoiding “speech by attribution;” that is, the government’s right not to be com-
pelled to speak by private citizens . . . [which] demonstrates the tricky inte
and relationship between the concepts of private and government speech. 
Sons of Con
anc). 
279 See Summum
ment speech). 
280 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
U.S. 624, 633–34 (1943); see supra notes 96–98. 
281 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006) (holding that government 
could restrict a government employee’s speech). See 
ing government restriction of employee speech). 
282 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422; see Norton, supra note 63, at 3 (“[A]lthough past courts fo-
cused on whether and when public employers’ interest in managerial control and opera-
tional efficiency outweighed workers’ speech interests, courts now concentrate on—and 
defer to—go
ssion.”). 
283 547 U.S. at
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re ives no First Amendment protection, and therefore an employee 
can be disciplined because of it.
ce
 expression with the agency 
at 
                                                                                                                     
284 
 The underlying principle of Garcetti is in many ways a concomitant 
of the principle in the Court’s 1968 decision in Rust v. Sullivan.285 In 
Rust, the Court recognized that when the government speaks, it must do 
so through individuals—doctors, in that particular case.286 In Garcetti, 
the Court essentially considered the reverse problem: individuals at-
tempting to speak for themselves may be mistaken for mouthpieces of 
the government. As the majority recognized, “when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”287 Courts have 
extended this reasoning, permitting the government to control even off-
duty speech by public employees.288 As Helen Norton notes, “these de-
cisions appear to reflect courts’ intuition that the public will inevitably 
associate government employees’ off-duty
th employs them in a way that may undermine government’s ability to 
communicate its own views effectively.”289 
 The government’s interest in avoiding speech-by-attribution is un-
doubtedly a strong one, and for that reason government employment 
cases raise more difficult problems in terms of identifying government 
viewpoint. Perhaps the government need not assert a specific viewpoint 
to justify its desire to avoid speech by attribution any more than a pri-
vate speaker must do so to prevail on a compelled speech claim.290 The 
 
284 Id. at 421. 
285 Compare id. (restricting government employee speech with respect to official gov-
ernment duties), with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991) (restricting the speech of 
doctors who receive federal funding). 
286 See 500 U.S. at 196–200 (holding that doctors’ speech can be restricted to the ex-
tent it is inconsistent with the U.S. Government's Title X program); id. at 209 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (“The regulations are also clearly viewpoint based. While suppressing speech 
favorable to abortion with one hand, the Secretary compels antiabortion speech with the 
other.”). 
287 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
288 See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81–84 (2004) (per curiam) (holding 
that firing a police officer for off-duty maintenance of a sexually explicit website was not a 
First Amendment violation); see also Norton, supra note 63, at 18 (indicating that lower 
courts have utilized City of San Diego v. Roe to “permit the firing of government workers for 
a variety of off-duty speech that makes no reference to the government”). 
289 Norton, supra note 63, at 16. 
290 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134–37 (holding that the government speech defense 
does not require an articulated viewpoint); Developments in the Law—State Action and the 
Public/Private Distinction, supra note 21, at 1300 (establishing that compelled speech violates 
the First Amendment regardless of whether the speech expresses a viewpoint with which 
the speaker disagrees). 
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complaints in Barnette and Wooley were undoubtedly filed because pri-
vate individuals disagreed with the messages they were being compelled 
to communicate, but the results of the cases did not turn on that 
fact.291 Rather, the Court invoked the simple principle that “the right 
. . . protected by the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”292 Perhaps 
the same type of viewpoint-agnostic rule should apply when the gov-
ernment seeks to avoid speech-by-attribution. Even so, Norton con-
cludes that “[n]ormally” the First Amendment “should require gov-
rnm
aced a four-factor test 
for c s to 
sugg
4) 
are particularly useful in identifying it: whether the government estab-
                                                                                                                     
e ent to communicate clear expectations about the message that it 
seeks to protect . . . .”293 
 In any event, not all courts have been entirely agnostic as to gov-
ernment viewpoint. Prior to Johanns, and in an apparent effort to fill 
the gap left by the Supreme Court’s failure to define government 
speech, some U.S. courts of appeals have embr
haracterizing government speech, the first factor of which seem
est the relevance of government viewpoint: 
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech 
in question occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exer-
cised by the government or private entities over the content of 
the speech; (3) the identity of the “literal speaker”; and (
whether the government or the private entity bears the “ulti-
mate responsibility” for the content of the speech . . . .294 
 It is unclear whether the test survived Johanns.295 And yet Johanns 
itself arguably increased the doctrinal emphasis on government pur-
pose. Though the opinion “did not offer a comprehensive analytical 
definition of ‘government speech,’”296 it did emphasize two factors that 
 
291 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (holding that the First Amendment right includes the right 
to abstain from speaking); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (stating a similarly definitive rule against 
compelled speech: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”). 
292 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. 
293 Norton, supra note 63, at 63. 
294 Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618; accord Wells v. City & County of Denver, 
257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing a similar test). 
295 Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (questioning the 
vitality of a four-factor test in light of Johanns); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 
380 (6th Cir. 2006) (same). 
296 2 Rodney Smolla, Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech §§ 19:25.50, 19:60.2 
(2007). 
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lished the message, and whether it approved “every word” of the mes-
sage.297 Scholars, too, have called for increased attention to the actual 
viewpoint the government has expressed,298 especially in certain lim-
ited contexts such as where the government is seeking to limit public 
read out a statement saying that abortions are sinful. The latter prac-
                                                                                                                     
employee speech.299 
 Why have these calls for increased identification of viewpoint 
gone largely unheeded? For one thing, the government often has 
ample incentive to obscure its viewpoint.300 This is especially true in 
government speech cases, like Summum, involving religious speech 
that might violate the Establishment Clause if the government were so 
to claim.301 Notwithstanding the Establishment Clause (the one clear 
limitation on government speech302), the government may also wish 
to avoid proclaiming a viewpoint for the simple reason that doing so 
risks emphasizing the government’s disagreement with the private 
speaker and thereby characterizing the government’s action as view-
point discrimination.303 Moreover, it may be that in some situations 
the government can more effectively advance its purposes by disguis-
ing its voice. In the Rust scenario, for example, preventing doctors 
from expressing a pro-choice “viewpoint” may have been more effec-
tive in discouraging abortions than requiring those same doctors to 
 
297 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. 
298 See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 17, at 1384 (suggesting that government 
speech includes only “purposeful action by government, expressing its own distinct mes-
sage, which is understood by those who receive it to be the government’s message”). 
299 Norton, supra note 63, at 68. 
More careful attention to what it is that government seeks to express—and 
whether that expression is actually threatened by contested employee 
speech—can help capture and accommodate those interests more precisely 
while providing greater protection for workers’ own free speech rights as well 
as the public’s interest in transparent government. 
Id. 
300 See Gey, supra note 28, at 1263 (noting that government can limit speech without 
having to justify the limitation). 
301 Id. (“In Summum, the Court enhances the government speech category of First 
Amendment law to the point that the government can evade other First Amendment restric-
tions on its behavior without engaging in the communicative behavior that supposedly justi-
fied the evasion in the first place.”); see Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring). 
302 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 553 (“[T]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from 
First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
303 Such viewpoint discrimination would implicate the First Amendment and be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
845 (1995) (holding that viewpoint discrimination resulted in a denial of free speech). 
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tice, though more viewpoint-transparent, might have come across as 
overly paternalistic and therefore less effective in shaping behavior.304 
 Another possible explanation for the government speech doc-
trine’s ambivalence about government viewpoint may be that govern-
ment speech is not always about government viewpoint. Instead, gov-
ernment may attempt to invoke the doctrine in some cases where it 
seeks to do nothing more than remain silent or neutral on a contro-
versy to avoid having a private viewpoint imputed to it. Or perhaps the 
doctrine does (or should) cover all government “communication” in-
cluding such putatively viewpoint-neutral messages as weather reports 
and other information. 
 And yet, for all the reasons laid out above, viewpoint discrimina-
tion is the very heart of much government speech. If Pleasant Grove 
City, in an effort to establish its viewpoint neutrality, were to disclaim 
any expressive interest in Pioneer Park, then it would simultaneously be 
disclaiming government speech. That is, the very justification for gov-
ernment speech operating outside the First Amendment is the gov-
ernment’s need to clearly express its viewpoints.305 And yet courts and 
scholars have tried to claim simultaneous fidelity to both the govern-
ment speech doctrine and the principle of viewpoint neutrality.306 
 The hesitation to recognize government viewpoint, and to recog-
nize that its expression can require limits on private viewpoints, could 
as a rhetorical matter reflect a general discomfort with viewpoint dis-
crimination, or with the related difficulty of drawing lines between gov-
ernment speech and public forum doctrine.307 The final Part of this 
                                                                                                                      
 
304 See Gey, supra note 28, at 1273 (“[I]f the government candidly said what it really 
meant, the message would be totally ineffective with members of the target audience, who 
are unlikely to take kindly to the government’s blunt moral paternalism.”); see also Freder-
ick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 373, 381 (1983) (reviewing 
Yudof, supra note 24) (“[A]ntigovernment biases may be so great, particularly with refer-
ence to the veracity of political leaders, that much government speech may encounter a 
public strongly predisposed to disbelief.”). 
305 Cf. Park, supra note 2, at 123–24 (noting that “[t]he rationale for this unusual free-
dom of action is that government can only promote and support its programs and policies 
by presenting its point of view to the exclusion of opposing viewpoints” and also the neces-
sity of government speech to promote programs and regulate content to maintain a clear 
message). 
306 See supra notes 222–248 and accompanying text. 
307 The two difficulties are related, of course, because the viewpoint neutrality re-
quirement only comes into play if one decides that government speech is not at issue. See 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
[C]ourts must apply categories such as “government speech,” “public fo-
rums,” “limited public forums,” and “nonpublic forums” with an eye towards 
their purposes—lest we turn “free speech” doctrine into a jurisprudence of 
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Article suggests that the best way to solve this doctrinal mess is to em-
brace it—to admit that the First Amendment permits viewpoint dis-
crimination and to establish conditions governing it. 
III. A Way Forward 
 Solving the problems described above essentially means reconciling 
two incompatible concepts: government viewpoints and viewpoint neu-
trality.308 This Part offers some tentative suggestions for a solution. The 
argument proceeds in two Sections. Section A argues that, despite the 
problems described in the first two Parts,309 government speech can 
play a valuable and perhaps essential role in the functioning of a de-
mocracy.310 Section B first outlines previous attempts to reconcile gov-
ernment speech and viewpoint neutrality.311 It then suggests a few pos-
sible changes. Subsection B.1 suggests that government speech should 
only be allowed when adequate alternatives exist for private speech, or 
when government speech has only a de minimis effect on private 
speech.312 Alternatively, subsection B.2 proposes that government 
speech should apply only when the government has no adequate alter-
natives for communication.313 Finally, subsection B.3 posits that the gov-
ernment must affirmatively provide adequate alternatives when invok-
ing government speech doctrine.314 These changes might help 
reconcile an Amendment that requires the government to be neutral as 
to viewpoints and a political system that requires it to engage with them. 
                                                                                                                      
labels. . . . [Looking beyond categorization] helps to ask whether a govern-
ment action burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action’s ten-
dency to further a legitimate government objective. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
308 Cf. Cole, supra note 17, at 709 (“The two foundations of First Amendment jurispru-
dence appear at odds. One envisions government staying out of the marketplace of ideas 
altogether, and the other suggests that government is most legitimate when it seeks to in-
fluence the marketplace of ideas through persuasion.”). 
309 See supra notes 37–194 and accompanying text (arguing that government speech is 
at odds with First Amendment jurisprudence); supra notes 195–307 and accompanying 
text (demonstrating the difficulty in ascertaining government viewpoint). 
310 See infra notes 315–326 and accompanying text. 
311 See infra notes 327–342 and accompanying text. 
312 See infra notes 343–367 and accompanying text. 
313 See infra notes 368–393 and accompanying text. 
314 See infra notes 394–404 and accompanying text. 
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A. Preserving a Place for Government Expressions of Viewpoint 
 The story up until now has generally cast government speech as a 
villain. But, as is often the case, at the end of this particular story the 
villain turns out to have some redeeming qualities. 
 First, government speech is simply necessary—the government 
must be able to express viewpoints in order to function at all.315 As 
Randall Bezanson and William Buss note in their comprehensive survey 
of government speech doctrine: “Democratic governments must speak, 
for democracy is a two-way affair . . . . Speech is but one means that 
government must have at its disposal to conduct its affairs and to ac-
complish its ends.”316 To be successful, a First Amendment theory must 
come to grips with this basic fact.317 Doing so may mean formally jetti-
soning the (supposed) commitment to viewpoint neutrality.318 As Rob-
ert Post notes, “it is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to 
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the 
Court to seriously prohibit viewpoint discrimination in the internal 
management of speech.”319 And Steven Shiffrin argues that “[i]f gov-
ernment is to secure cooperation in implementing its programs, if it is 
to be able to maintain a dialogue with its citizens about their needs . . . 
government must be able to communicate.”320 
 Second, government speech is not always a necessary evil; often it 
is a necessary good. Writing a decade before even Mark Yudof, and thus 
well before modern government speech doctrine, Thomas Emerson 
concluded that government speech “enables the government to in-
                                                                                                                      
315 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“Indeed, it is 
not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom.”); Keller v. 
State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990) (“If every citizen were to have the right to insist that no 
one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of 
great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process 
of government as we know it radically transformed.”). 
316 Bezanson & Buss, supra note 17, at 1380; accord Bezanson, supra note 69, at 980 
(“Perhaps the most compelling reasons supporting the government’s power to engage in 
protected expression are purely practical. Without the capacity to act as a speaker, gov-
ernment could not do many of the things it does and must do.”). 
317 Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U. L. Rev. 237, 244 
(1978) (“Nor can an acceptable free speech theory demand that government be an ideo-
logical eunuch . . . .”). 
318 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First 
Amendment generally prevents government from prescribing speech, or even expressive 
conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.” (internal citations omitted)). 
319 Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Pub-
lic Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1825 (1987). 
320 Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 565, 606 (1980). 
2011] Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech 751 
form, explain, and persuade—measures especially crucial in a society 
that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force . . . . In 
short, government expression is a necessary and healthy part of the 
system.”321 Abner Greene has also pointed out similar benefits of gov-
ernment speech: “[G]overnment speech can help foster debate, flesh-
ing out views, and leading towards a more educated citizenry and a bet-
ter chance of reaching the right answer.”322 At the very least, as Shiffrin 
argues, transparent and clear government speech should aid democ-
ratic accountability by giving the public “the advantage of knowing the 
collective judgment of the legislature and of knowing the views of its 
representatives, which would in turn be useful for evaluating them.”323 
 This promotion of an educated citizenry is of course tied to the 
“democratic” justification for government speech’s exemption from the 
First Amendment. So long as the government openly communicates 
with citizens, they can presumably evaluate the government’s actions 
and hold their representatives accountable at the ballot box.324 Norton 
suggests that government speech “derives its constitutional salience 
primarily, if not exclusively, from its instrumental value in facilitating 
listeners’ informed decisionmaking.”325 Of course, as noted above, the 
democratic rationale for government speech is undercut by the fact 
that government speech doctrine does not require the government to 
identify itself when speaking.326 But this obscuring of government 
speech, in turn, does not necessarily mean that there are no democ-
ratic reasons to value government speech. The information it conveys 
may not be perfectly transparent, but it can still contribute to informed 
self-governance. 
B. Possible Solutions 
 The government’s need to express its viewpoints cannot easily be 
reconciled with the principle of viewpoint neutrality.327 This final Sec-
tion outlines some potential treaty terms between the two warring prin-
                                                                                                                      
321 Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 698 (1970); see also 
Norton & Citron, supra note 15, at 902 (“[G]overnment expression’s value springs primar-
ily from its capacity to inform the public of its government’s principles and priorities.”). 
322 Greene, supra note 112, at 11. 
323 Shiffrin, supra note 320, at 604. 
324 Id. 
325 Norton, supra note 63, at 21 n.75. 
326 See supra notes 130–142 and accompanying text. 
327 Post, supra note 17, at 165 (observing the inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of viewpoint prohibition in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819 (1995)). 
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ciples. Specifically, it focuses on what might happen were we to surren-
der—or, more accurately, recognize that we have already surrendered— 
our supposed commitment to viewpoint neutrality and instead focus on 
workable rules to govern viewpoint-based speech regulations. 
 This is not the first effort to bring peace to these belligerent First 
Amendment principles. Prior efforts have sought to offer something to 
both viewpoint discrimination and government speech, for example 
prohibiting the government from engaging in viewpoint discrimination 
in certain contexts.328 David Cole would protect “spheres of neutrality” 
in which government neutrality towards viewpoints is essential to the 
functioning of a particular institution—the press or educational institu-
tions, for example.329 Robert Post approaches the problem by calling 
for a move away from the unhelpful question of what constitutes 
“speech,” towards increased focus on “relevant processes of social char-
acterization.”330 And Mary Jean Dolan argues that if the government 
creates “special public purpose forum[s]” for particular civic, cultural, 
or aesthetic purposes, it should be allowed to discriminate on the basis 
of viewpoint within them.331 It is far beyond the scope of this Article to 
add (or, hopefully, subtract) from these efforts. I mention them here 
only as evidence that efforts have been made to separate areas in which 
the government must remain neutral from those in which it need not. 
 The alternatives suggested here share something with those of 
Cole, Post, Dolan and others. Like those scholars’ arguments, these 
alternatives abandon—or recognize the abandonment of—the com-
mitment to unwavering viewpoint neutrality.332 Even holding aside the 
special example of government speech, which this Article has charac-
terized as an exception to the viewpoint neutrality requirement, First 
                                                                                                                      
328 See sources cited infra notes 329–331 and accompanying text. 
329 Cole, supra note 17, at 716. 
330 Post, supra note 17, at 152. Such processes of social characterization include: (1) de-
fining the domain that the government speech reaches (public discourse or professional 
speech) and identifying constitutional values that apply to that category of speech, and (2) 
characterizing the government action as standards for allocating government funding or as 
internal directives to government officials. Id. at 195. The former is subject to more constitu-
tional constraints. Id. 
331 Dolan, supra note 77, at 113–15. 
332 See Cole, supra note 17, at 716 (defending viewpoint neutrality within certain gov-
ernmental spheres); Dolan, supra note 77, at 113–15 (accepting viewpoint discrimination 
in certain forums); Post, supra note 17, at 152 (promoting analysis of government speech 
to determine the appropriateness of viewpoint neutrality). 
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Amendment doctrine is littered with viewpoint casualties.333 In Schau-
er’s words: 
As with the other false paths, the path of viewpoint discrimi-
nation ultimately leads to the point at which we must ac-
knowledge that some forms of viewpoint discrimination by 
government enterprises are permissible and some forms are 
not, with the bare idea of viewpoint discrimination of little as-
sistance in separating the one from the other.334 
 So it simply will not do to try to conceal the expressiveness of 
speech regulations. Instead of treating viewpoint neutrality as a First 
Amendment absolute, we should frankly admit, as the doctrine already 
indicates, that the Constitution permits the government to limit private 
speech on the basis of viewpoint.335 And yet one does not have to be a 
card-carrying member of the ACLU to be somewhat concerned about 
that sacrifice. So let us add a limiting principle.336 A few possibilities 
present themselves, some more promising than others. 
 First, let us consider and discard one possible solution—separating 
the “expressiveness” element of a speech prohibition from the rest of it. 
One could imagine trying to divide a particular speech regulation into 
constituent elements or purposes—some intended to express a gov-
ernment viewpoint (and which are therefore eligible for favorable 
treatment as government speech) and some simply intended to limit a 
particular private activity without “expressing” anything (and which are 
therefore subject to analysis like any other content-neutral regulation). 
Governments, after all, presumably pass laws for many reasons, not all 
of them expressive. And yet discerning the expressive from the unex-
pressive is deeply problematic. The effort to separate expressive from 
unexpressive is reminiscent of the now-discredited theory that the 
“conduct element” of a private action can be separated from the 
                                                                                                                      
333 E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991) (restricting the speech of doctors 
who receive government subsidy); see supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (establishing 
that government speech is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny). 
334 Schauer, supra note 52, at 106. 
335 See Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the 
Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 945, 946 (2010) (“Our commit-
ment to neutrality is in fact a source of serious difficulties, but it doesn’t need to be: we 
could simply relinquish the commitment (at least in theory).”). 
336 Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 189, 200 (1983) (describing “modest viewpoint-based restrictions”). 
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“speech element.”337 Perhaps most notably, Thomas Emerson sug-
gested that if the latter “predominated,” then the First Amendment was 
implicated, and if the conduct element predominated, then there was 
no free speech issue.338 But John Hart Ely provided the devastating 
counterpoint: “[B]urning a draft card to express opposition to the draft 
is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% expression . . . . 
Attempts to determine which element ‘predominates’ will therefore 
inevitably degenerate into question-begging judgments about whether 
the activity should be protected.”339 As it is with speech activities, so it is 
with speech regulations—they are “100%” expressive. If the govern-
ment’s expressive interests are to be recognized, then those interests 
are undoubtedly implicated fully in every speech regulation the gov-
ernment passes. That is the root of the problem, not the solution. 
 Having rejected a false start, we can instead consider three more 
promising candidates: permitting government speech as a defense only 
where it leaves sufficient alternatives for private speakers, permitting 
government speech only where the government has insufficient alter-
natives, and permitting government speech only where the government 
creates equal alternatives for private speakers.340 All three of these possi-
bilities rely in one way or another on the concept of “adequate alterna-
tives,” a concept normally employed in time, place, and manner analy-
sis.341 There is a reason for this. At root, the problem in government 
speech cases is akin to that in time, place, and manner cases—the need 
to accommodate two conflicting speech acts (or even viewpoints) in a 
way that does not impermissibly disable one or the other.342 This kind 
                                                                                                                      
337 Tribe, supra note 317, at 242 (“How the empty speech-conduct distinction could 
have survived as long as it did in a world without extrasensory communication remains a 
mystery to me.”). 
338 See Emerson, supra note 321, at 80. 
339 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing 
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1495 (1975). 
340 See infra notes 343–404 and accompanying text. 
341 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that re-
strictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample al-
ternative channels for communication of the information. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
342 Compare Clark, 268 U.S. at 290–93 (permitting the restriction of protestors from hav-
ing structures on the National Mall overnight), with Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134–37 (re-
stricting the Summum monument but permitting others). 
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of balancing of incompatibles is precisely what the time, place, and 
manner test seeks to accomplish, and what the government speech 
paradox needs. 
1. Government Speech Must Leave Adequate Alternatives for Private 
Speakers, or Else Must Have Only a De Minimis Effect on the Private 
Speaker 
 Part of the intuitive appeal of characterizing a subsidy denial as 
something other than a “regulation” is the impression that a subsidy 
denial leaves the private speaker free to express him- or herself in other 
ways.343 At best, then, the interference with the speaker’s speech rights 
is de minimis; at worst, it preserves adequate (or perhaps even ample) 
alternative avenues of expression. Although the subsidy/regulation dis-
tinction tends to break down for all the reasons set out in Part I.C,344 
the intuition need not be entirely discarded.345 That is, even if it is ac-
cepted that government speech is a viewpoint-based regulation on pri-
vate speech, such regulation is not unconstitutional because the regu-
lated speaker has sufficient alternative avenues of communication. 
 The concept of “adequate alternatives” is at the heart of time, 
place, and manner doctrine.346 Under the usual time, place, and man-
ner test, the government may pass content-neutral restrictions so long 
as they are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est” and “leave open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion.”347 The government speech variation on that test would simply 
omit the content neutrality requirement and permit the government to 
regulate private speech when that speech interferes with the govern-
ment’s message and where the regulations preserve alternative avenues 
of communication for private speakers. This would, to be sure, repre-
sent a major change in doctrine. The First Amendment’s bar on view-
point discrimination does not have an ample alternatives exception.348 
                                                                                                                      
 
343 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1140–41 (“[N]o one claims that the City prevents Sum-
mum’s members from engaging in speech in a form more transient than a permanent 
monument.”); Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (holding that doctors may advise patients regarding 
abortion outside the scope of the government subsidy); cf. Bezanson, supra note 69, at 979 
(“[G]overnment’s expressive activities must not displace competing speech from the mar-
ket, though they may displace competing speech from a part of the market.”). 
344 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1140–41; Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
345 See supra notes 143–194 and accompanying text. 
346 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
347 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
348 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (implying 
that, regardless of adequate alternatives, government cannot discriminate based on view-
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And yet, preserving the adequate alternatives requirement in the con-
text of government speech would help ensure that private speakers can 
still communicate their viewpoints in some way, even if not precisely the 
way that they would have liked. This represents a disadvantage, of 
course, but it at least is not a flat-out viewpoint ban. 
                                                                                                                     
 Another way to evaluate a government regulation through the 
same basic lens is by looking not simply at whether alternatives are “ad-
equate” or even “ample,” but whether the overall impact on private 
speakers is so small as to be negligible.349 The Summum may not be 
able to erect their monument in Pioneer Park, but there are still many 
other places where they can, so they have not been muzzled so much as 
slightly inconvenienced. This is an attractive rule precisely because it 
has such intuitive appeal. If private speakers who have been displaced 
by the government still have a wide range of forums available in which 
to express their messages, then any “harm” to them may be so small as 
to be constitutionally insignificant. Their speech has been “regulated” 
in some sense, but it has not been stifled. They may express their view-
points elsewhere just as effectively, or almost as effectively. Meanwhile, 
the government can express the messages and viewpoints that it must 
convey in order to govern. 
 Presumably this approach would preserve a broad range of gov-
ernmental speech. Consider two brief examples.350 First, a slight varia-
tion on the Summum facts: a private group donates a statue of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. to a public park. It is the first monument in the park, 
so there is no chance of clutter. The next day, the Ku Klux Klan pre-
sents a statue of a hooded figure. Clearly the town does not want to ac-
cept the second monument, not because it would clutter the park, but 
because the town disavows its viewpoint. So long as the impact on the 
Klan is minimal—so long as it has ample alternatives for expressing its 
message (as it presumably would)—the government should prevail. 
 Second, one might consider the digitized forum, as exemplified in 
the 2008 case Page v. Lexington County School District, decided by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.351 In that case, a public school 
 
point in a public forum); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845 (holding that viewpoint dis-
crimination resulted in a denial of free speech). 
349 Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2991 (2010) (“But when ac-
cess barriers are viewpoint neutral, our decisions have counted it significant that other 
available avenues for the group to exercise its First Amendment rights lessen the burden 
created by those barriers.”). 
350 I am grateful to Helen Norton for suggesting these. 
351 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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board took a position against school vouchers and permitted commu-
nication of that position on its website and in communications to par-
ents.352 A voucher supporter sought to have pro-voucher materials 
posted on the district’s website as well, but the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that the website amounted to the district’s own speech and thus 
rejected the claim.353 This solution, too, makes sense under the gov-
ernment speech variant discussed here, because the voucher oppo-
nents presumably had numerous other avenues through which to ex-
press their position. 
 The Supreme Court has in fact implicitly applied elements of this 
approach in its public forum cases, albeit never explicitly so when view-
point discrimination was also involved.354 The Court’s 2010 decision in 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez provides a perfect example.355 The 
Court ruled that a public university could require student groups to 
admit all comers, despite the burden this would place on the groups’ 
rights to free speech and association.356 In doing so, the Court noted 
that: 
If restrictions on access to a limited public forum are view-
point discriminatory, the ability of a group to exist outside the 
forum would not cure the constitutional shortcoming. But 
when access barriers are viewpoint neutral, our decisions have 
counted it significant that other available avenues for the 
group to exercise its First Amendment rights lessen the bur-
den created by those barriers.357 
 The Court noted that the Christian Legal Society still had “access 
to school facilities to conduct meetings and the use of chalkboards and 
generally available bulletin boards to advertise events.”358 Furthermore, 
it could take advantage of the “advent of electronic media and social-
networking sites.”359 
 Despite its evident strengths, this approach to government speech 
also has substantial shortcomings. For one thing, as Justice Alito indi-
                                                                                                                      
352 Id. at 278–79. 
353 Id. at 284–85. 
354 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 53 (1983) 
(upholding a restriction where, among other things, there were “substantial alternative 
channels that remain open for communication to take place”). 
355 130 S. Ct. at 2995. 
356 See id. 
357 Id. at 2991. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. 
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cated in his dissent in Christian Legal Society, there is no officially recog-
nized de minimis exception to the First Amendment’s bar on viewpoint 
discrimination.360 All else being equal, the government cannot, for ex-
ample, require Republican protestors to stage their protests five feet 
further away from the Capitol than Democratic protestors. Indeed, as 
the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minnesota 
demonstrates, the government may not engage in viewpoint discrimi-
nation even if the regulated speech technically falls outside the ambit 
of the First Amendment, where the burden on protected speech is pre-
sumably nonexistent.361 
 Moreover, the adequate alternatives requirement may not be quite 
enough to ensure that private viewpoints are sufficiently protected.362 
The Court’s time, place, and manner cases363—not to mention its “ero-
genous zoning” cases364—do not give one much reason to think that 
the Court will use such a rule to enforce the rights of individual speak-
ers. The Court has said time and time again that alternatives need not 
be identical, nor even all that similar, to be sufficient.365 In its 1986 de-
cision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court determined 
that a zoning restriction permitted “reasonable alternative avenues of 
communication” even though “‘practically none’ of the undeveloped 
land [was] currently for sale or lease, and . . . in general there [were] 
no ‘commercially viable’ adult theater sites within the 520 acres left 
open by the Renton ordinance.”366 In its 1985 decision in Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., the Court stressed that to 
be constitutional, speech restrictions (at least in limited public forums) 
“need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.”367 
 The flexibility in what counts as “adequate,” however, can also be 
something of a strength, in that it permits the test to be tailored in a 
way that either expands adequacy to mean any reasonably comparable 
alternative (thus expanding the reach of government speech doctrine) 
or narrows it to mean only alternatives that are substantially identical 
                                                                                                                      
360 See id. at 3006 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“We have never before taken the view that a lit-
tle viewpoint discrimination is acceptable.”). 
361 See 505 U.S. at 393. 
362 See infra notes 363–366 and accompanying text. 
363 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
364 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime The-
atres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986). 
365 See, e.g., Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 54; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985). 
366 475 U.S. at 50, 53. 
367 473 U.S. at 808. 
2011] Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech 759 
(thus limiting the reach of the doctrine). This elasticity, of course, rais-
es a whole new set of questions that demand more thorough answers 
that can be provided here. But it suffices to say that, depending on how 
it is applied, the adequate alternatives analysis proposed here could 
lead to a broad government speech doctrine or a narrow one. This is 
also true, albeit in the opposite fashion, for the proposal discussed in 
the following subsection. 
 Perhaps a more stringent precondition should apply before the 
government can invoke the government speech defense. The following 
subsection considers such a modification. 
2. The Government May Only Invoke Government Speech Doctrine 
Where the Government Lacks Adequate Alternatives 
 This subsection provides two related suggestions. First, when the 
government has a legitimate message and private speech would conflict 
with this expression, the government speech doctrine should be avail-
able. Principles of distortion prevention and scarcity management help 
support this suggestion, but these justifications are problematic. Accord-
ingly, the second suggestion proposes that government speech doctrine 
should apply only when the government has no other way to express its 
viewpoint aside from suppressing private speech. Although this second 
test could lead to unsavory results, such results could be avoided 
through an expansive interpretation of adequate alternatives. 
 If the government is to be treated as a “speaker,” as government 
speech doctrine effectively does, then it stands to reason that the ade-
quate alternatives analysis applied to private speakers in time, place, 
and manner cases can be turned around and applied to the govern-
ment itself.368 Thus, instead of permitting the government speech de-
fense where private speakers have adequate alternatives for expressing 
their viewpoints, it might be permitted only where the government has 
no adequate alternatives available for expressing its viewpoint.369 In 
other words, when the government has a legitimate message it needs to 
                                                                                                                      
368 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (applying the time, place, and manner test); Clark, 468 
U.S. at 293 (same). 
369 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (illustrating that government has 
no adequate alternatives other than to restrict employee speech to prevent private speech 
from being attributed to it); Rust, 500 U.S. at 173 (holding that the government may re-
strict doctors’ speech, lest the public attribute abortion counseling to the government, and 
determining that the government had no adequate alternative means by which to avoid 
this outcome). 
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express, and private speech interferes with that message, then the gov-
ernment speech exception may be available. 
 This test could have a relatively broad application because private 
speech often does interfere, as a practical matter, with the govern-
ment’s expression of its own message.370 A government-funded doctor 
who encouraged his patients to have abortions, for example, would in-
terfere with the anti-abortion viewpoint the government intended to 
communicate through the law challenged in Rust, which denied federal 
funding to doctors who provided such information to their patients.371 
To protect its message in such cases, the current rationale of govern-
ment speech doctrine suggests that the government may limit private 
speakers. 
 But this is not a problem that is unique to the government, and one 
of the many mysteries of government speech doctrine is why it provides 
only the government with a remedy for this class of speech harms. Pri-
vate speakers constantly face situations in which their efforts to speak 
are drowned out or “distorted” by others. But disagreement and even 
distortion do not give one private speaker the power to silence another, 
absent some other legal powers like an employer-employee relation-
ship.372 For example, if a private individual wanted to speak in Pioneer 
Park at the same time as representatives of the Summum, but the repre-
sentatives’ message was louder (or simply more appealing) than the in-
dividual’s, the individual could not on that basis alone exclude the rep-
resentatives from the park.373 But that is precisely what Pleasant Grove 
City was able to do.374 This is troubling, as there is no particular reason 
why the government, alone among speakers, should be able to protect 
its messages from distortion. And yet that is the exact—and apparently 
sole—rationale behind most government speech cases.375 
                                                                                                                      
 
370 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 (noting that the Christian organiza-
tion’s exclusion of non-Christians interfered with the government’s anti-discrimination 
policy); Rust, 500 U.S. at 178–79 (indicating that a doctor’s private speech regarding abor-
tion counseling interfered with the government’s anti-abortion message). 
371 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178–79. 
372 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (holding that when the government acts as an em-
ployer, it can limit private speech of employees); supra notes 281–284 and accompanying text. 
373 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 300 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Respondents’ attempt at 
camping in the park . . . is conduct that interferes with the rights of others to use Lafayette 
Park . . . . Lafayette Park and others like it are for all the people, and their rights are not to 
be trespassed even by those who have some ‘statement’ to make.”). 
374 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138. 
375 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. The fact that Pioneer Park was state 
owned is no answer, as nearly all public forums are state-owned. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 
1126. The fact that the government, alone among “speakers,” is democratically chosen and 
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 If the government were not given unbounded power to protect its 
viewpoints by discriminating against others, would it thereby lose its 
ability to effectively communicate? Hardly. As described above, gov-
ernment speech is, if anything, too powerful, not too weak.376 Even if it 
is not permitted to muzzle private speakers, the government still has a 
vast array of powerful tools and platforms by which to make itself 
heard.377 But if those tools are not enough to protect the government’s 
speech from distortion by competing speakers, then the appropriate 
remedies should be those available to private speakers facing the same 
problem. Indeed, First Amendment doctrine already implicitly recog-
nizes the problems caused by incompatibility of private speech, and 
provides means for resolving it. The time, place, and manner test, for 
example, prevents private speakers from monopolizing speech forums 
to the detriment of other would-be speakers.378 It protects expression, 
that is, without countenancing viewpoint-based discrimination. Intellec-
tual property often permits the silencing of private speakers to prevent 
them from misusing or distorting another’s message.379 Defamation 
law, too, allows individuals to silence other private speakers whose mes-
sage represents a harmful distortion of their own.380 
 But unlike government speech, none of these doctrines permit pri-
vate individuals to silence other private speakers simply because they 
have expressed a contrary viewpoint. Of course, one might say that cases 
like Summum are somewhat different, in that there are competing private 
interests at stake, and the government must step in to accommodate 
them all. This seemed to be implicit in the majority’s decision, which 
turned largely on the fact that the monuments in Pioneer Park were 
permanent, physical, and therefore incompatible with one another: 
The obvious truth of the matter is that if public parks were 
considered to be traditional public forums for the purpose of 
erecting privately donated monuments, most parks would 
                                                                                                                      
therefore democratically accountable may go further towards addressing the problem. See id. 
But for all the reasons discussed in Part I.B.3, the democratic solution to viewpoint discrimi-
nation is not likely to be satisfactory. See supra notes 130–142 and accompanying text. 
376 See supra notes 66–142 and accompanying text. 
377 See Yudof, supra note 24, at 6–10 (describing various ways in which the government 
can speak). 
378 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (utilizing the time, place, and manner test). 
379 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555–60 
(1985) (holding that the First Amendment does not shield speech that infringes another’s 
copyright). 
380 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383–84 (noting that defamation “can, consistently with the 
First Amendment, be regulated . . . .”). 
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have little choice but to refuse all such donations. And where 
the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexora-
bly to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is 
out of place.381 
 But even assuming these fears to be well founded, it is not the 
viewpoint neutrality principle that would “lead almost inexorably to the 
closing of the forum.”382 Indeed, the majority’s rationale demonstrates, 
quite convincingly, not the proposition for which it was offered—that 
the government was expressing a message—but that the government 
had a compelling viewpoint-neutral reason to regulate the number of 
monuments. That is, if it allowed every monument in the park, then 
the forum would effectively dry up—the equivalent of a tragedy of the 
commons.383 Thus there may be a perfectly good reason to cap the 
number of monuments. But if preventing a tragedy of the commons is 
the reason for rationing the forum, there is no reason why that cap 
should carry with it the right to exclude based on viewpoint. The space 
for monuments could just as easily be parceled out according to a lot-
tery, a first-come, first-served basis, or in some other viewpoint-neutral 
manner. And if that is the case, then Summum is not about government 
speech at all. It is, if anything, a time, place, and manner case.384 
 Thus, it seems that neither the distortion-prevention nor scarcity-
management rationales provide a sufficient justification for the gov-
ernment to engage in viewpoint-based regulation.385 Both rationales 
identify real harms to the speech marketplace, but they can be ad-
dressed in a viewpoint-neutral way. Perhaps the solution can neverthe-
less be rehabilitated and restated in the following fashion: if the gov-
ernment has no other avenue (or at least no “adequate” avenue) for 
expressing its viewpoint—which, for all the reasons described in Part 
III.A, it must do386—then it may invoke government speech as a reason 
for limiting private speech. 
                                                                                                                      
381 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1138. 
382 See id. 
383 See id. at 1137; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1242, 1244–
45 (1968). 
384 It becomes a time, place, and manner case because the government is preventing 
clutter, rather than expressing a viewpoint. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (permitting the gov-
ernment to regulate the time and manner of protests on the National Mall, not to express 
a viewpoint but to serve a government function). 
385 See supra notes 370–384 and accompanying text. 
386 See supra notes 315–326 and accompanying text. 
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 This solution, too, has intuitive appeal, because it recognizes the 
government’s interest in speaking but does not permit the government 
to invoke that interest in a limitless set of scenarios. That is, it balances 
the government’s need to speak against the importance of the view-
point neutrality requirement. This approach could also help make 
sense of those difficult cases in which the government seeks to avoid 
speech-by-attribution.387 Even if the government does have a strong 
interest in avoiding improper attribution, it is at least theoretically pos-
sible that the government could vindicate that interest through the use 
of disclaimers or some other means.388 In other words, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the government should have a right to silence other 
speakers simply in order to avoid misattribution. 
 At the very least, then, the rule would help limit the government 
speech doctrine’s potential to erode First Amendment protections by 
guaranteeing that the government only invokes it as something like a 
last resort. It might, for example, lead to different results in the Ku 
Klux Klan and government website examples discussed above.389 In the 
former case, the government would not be able to exclude the statue of 
the hooded figure unless it could show that doing so would be the only 
way for the government to adequately communicate its position (or, 
conversely, the only way to adequately avoid communicating a position 
it did not support). Similarly, the school district would have to show 
that posting pro-voucher materials on its webpage would prevent the 
district from expressing its own opposition to the proposal.390 Such an 
argument seems unlikely to succeed, as in either case the government 
could post—in the park or online—disclaimers expressing its position. 
 These results may be unsavory, or even unpalatable, even though— 
like permitting Nazis to march in Skokie—they are the natural results of 
                                                                                                                      
387 See supra notes 290–293 and accompanying text. 
388 See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 17, at 1485; Jacobs, supra note 232, at 1398 
(indicating that government disclaimer may avoid misattribution of religious speech to the 
government). 
Where the expressive message is pervasive or widespread, disavowal may not 
be perfectly effective. Nevertheless, because the government’s capacity for 
communicating its position is extensive, it is better to rely on the govern-
ment’s access to the marketplace of ideas than to permit the government to 
curtail the marketplace. Government’s escape from unintended attribution, 
then, would be limited to disclaimer or disavowal only. 
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 17, at 1485. 
389 See supra notes 350–353 and accompanying text. 
390 See Page, 531 F.3d at 284–85. 
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the viewpoint neutrality principle.391 It may be possible to avoid them, 
however, without abandoning this second formulation of the govern-
ment speech test, which would allow the government to limit private 
speech when it has no adequate alternatives of expression.392 As noted 
above, the Court has made it clear that “adequate” alternatives need not 
be identical, and in fact may be far inferior.393 If adequacy were to be 
given an expansive definition, then it would lead to far less protection 
for government speech. That is, a private speaker could overcome the 
government speech defense simply by showing that the government had 
some reasonably comparable alternative avenue available for communi-
cation. Of course, this means exploiting the elasticity of the test. But by 
putting the thrust of the analysis on whether the government is able to 
convey its message—either in precisely the way it intended or in some 
adequate alternative method—it limits the reach of government speech 
doctrine to those cases in which the government truly needs it. 
3. The Government Must Create Equal Alternatives for Private 
Speakers When It Invokes Government Speech 
 As noted above, one of the shortcomings of the adequate alterna-
tives approach is that it has very little bite—courts may find any number 
of alternatives “adequate” even if they are plainly inferior.394 To fully 
protect private speakers and the viewpoint neutrality principle, perhaps 
the rules should place even more limitations on government speech, 
permitting it only where it leaves “as much and as good” alternatives for 
private speakers.395 The First Amendment would thus permit the gov-
ernment to limit private speech on the basis of viewpoint so long as in 
doing so it leaves or provides alternatives that are just as plentiful and 
just as good. 
 Such bargains, which blend the line between rule and remedy, are 
not unheard of in constitutional law. The kind of “equal treatment” 
                                                                                                                      
391 See generally Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). 
392 See supra notes 367–368 and accompanying text. 
393 See Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 53–54 (holding that “reasonable alternative avenues 
of communication” existed for the adult theatre even though none were “commercially 
viable”); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809 (“The First Amendment does not demand unrestricted 
access to a nonpublic forum merely because use of that forum may be the most efficient 
means of delivering the speaker’s message.”). 
394 See supra notes 362–367 and accompanying text. 
395 The appropriation of the Lockean Proviso is intentional. See John Locke, The Sec-
ond Treatise of Government 15 ( J.W. Gough ed. 1966) (1690) (“[N]o man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough and as good left 
in common for others.”). 
2011] Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech 765 
envisioned by this test is of a piece with the equality guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—a kinship that courts and scholars have long 
recognized.396 Perhaps even more interestingly, requiring the govern-
ment to “compensate” private speakers whose viewpoints are displaced 
by government speech would introduce into government speech doc-
trine the kind of constitutionally required trade-offs that are the foun-
dation of takings jurisprudence. The Fifth Amendment, of course, 
states that private property can only be taken for “public purpose,” and 
that the government must pay “just compensation” for it.397 And al-
though the text of the First Amendment does not contain such a com-
mand,398 the logic of requiring the government to “pay” for occupying 
presumptively private space in the marketplace of ideas does have a 
certain amount of logic to it. 
 Supporters of government speech might respond that this stan-
dard is the functional equivalent of a ban on viewpoint discrimination 
because it will be impossible to satisfy. Speech regulations, after all, in-
evitably lessen the avenues available to a private speaker. Presumably 
the Summum selected Pioneer Park as the site of their monument pre-
cisely because they thought it served their purposes better than any 
other place. It would seem to follow that relegating the monument 
elsewhere would, almost by definition, be depriving the Summum of 
their top choice and thereby leaving them with not quite “as much or 
as good.”399 Thus there is simply no way to ever satisfy the “as much and 
as good” requirement, and we might as well retain our commitment to 
viewpoint neutrality. 
 There is some force to the objection that the “as much and as 
good” limitation is impossible to achieve. Consider another intriguing 
implication of this approach: if the government wants to abandon its 
commitment to viewpoint neutrality, which is implicit in this approach, 
                                                                                                                      
396 See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (“[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention 
the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose 
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more 
controversial views.”). See generally Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975) (promoting the equality principle as the pre-
ferred ground for First Amendment analysis). 
397 U.S. Const. amend. V; see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) 
(holding that a government taking requires just compensation); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992) (same). 
398 See U.S. Const. amend. I. As is usually the case for First Amendment problems, tex-
tualism does not yield conclusive information—the words of the Amendment may not 
suggest a just compensation requirement, but neither do they suggest any protection for 
government speech. 
399 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130; Locke, supra note 395, at 15. 
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then in return it may have to affirmatively accommodate the speakers it 
disadvantages. For example, if Pleasant Grove truly seeks to protect its 
own message by excluding the Summum monument from Pioneer 
Park, then the city may have to take affirmative steps to provide a loca-
tion for the monument that is equally desirable. This could mean con-
structing a pedestal elsewhere, or giving it some other advantageous 
location that would not interfere with the government’s communica-
tion of its own message (which, after all, is supposedly the reason why 
the monument must be excluded from Pioneer Park).400 
 The “as much and as good” approach, it should be emphasized, is 
not one of viewpoint “neutrality.” The Summum, in this hypothetical, 
are being treated differently because of their viewpoint—they are being 
excluded from one park, even though they are being provided with an-
other. And yet the government gets to keep what it wants (or at least 
what government speech doctrine says it wants); a pure, unadulterated 
message of its own. This may not always be an attractive deal for the 
government, but legal privileges often involve taking the “bitter with 
the sweet.”401 If the government wants to discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint, it may have to affirmatively accommodate the private rights 
holders it displaces. 
 In practice, however, such forced subsidies are unlikely to be very 
appealing, precisely because they seemingly require the government to 
support a private viewpoint despite the fact (indeed, because of the 
fact) that it disagrees with it.402 In the Ku Klux Klan hypothetical, for 
example, the government would be permitted to refuse the hooded 
statue but would thereby have to provide—at taxpayer expense—an 
adequate alternative venue.403 Even toying with the concept of “ade-
quacy” (i.e., making it easier for the government to satisfy the test with-
out constructing a new park) is unlikely to prove satisfactory. In other 
situations, however, the government may be able to affirmatively but 
easily provide alternatives without appearing quite so involved in rep-
rehensible speech. In the website hypothetical, for example, the gov-
ernment might be able to provide adequate alternatives simply by ena-
                                                                                                                      
400 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130. 
401 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (observ-
ing the difficulty of ensuring and defining a substantive right). 
402 In the Rust scenario, for example, the government would have to provide “as much 
and as good” subsidy for doctors seeking to give advice about abortion. See supra note 371 
and accompanying text. 
403 See supra note 350 and accompanying text. 
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bling comments on the district’s website, or by setting up a separate 
website at virtually no public cost.404 
Conclusion 
 First Amendment doctrine cannot long stand as a house divided. 
The viewpoint neutrality principle indicates that government cannot 
restrict speech (nor, as Part I.C demonstrates, favor it)405 because of the 
viewpoint it expresses. But this is precisely what government speech 
doctrine allows and, in fact, requires. As currently stated, that doctrine 
gives the government a nearly unlimited power not only to flood the 
market with its own viewpoints, but to limit private speakers on the ba-
sis of theirs. The first steps towards rescuing viewpoint neutrality from 
the rest of the First Amendment lie in recognizing that a strict neutral-
ity requirement is simply incompatible with government speech, and in 
constructing doctrinally workable rules to limit the reach of the latter. 
 The solutions proposed here are all premised on doing away 
with—or, rather, admitting that we have already done away with—an 
unqualified commitment to viewpoint neutrality, which has long been 
thought to be the core of the First Amendment. Giving even an inch on 
this principle may seem like giving up the heart of the First Amend-
ment in order to save its limbs. But the very justification for govern-
ment speech doctrine—the government’s desire to silence a particular 
private speaker because of the message she expresses—is exactly what the 
First Amendment has long been thought to forbid. The solutions sug-
gested here seek to accommodate these principles without papering 
over their differences. 
 
404 See supra notes 352–353 and accompanying text. 
405 See supra notes 143–194 and accompanying text. 
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